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Simulating personal future events:  
Contributions from episodic memory and beyond 
 
 
Abstract 
Episodic simulation refers to the construction of imagined, hypothetical events that might 
occur in one’s personal future. Damage to our capacity for episodic simulation can produce 
grave consequences, impairing our ability to anticipate, plan, and prepare for the future. New 
theoretical approaches have begun to uncover the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying 
episodic simulation, but much remains to be examined. The purpose of this dissertation is to 
further investigate the mechanisms supporting episodic simulation as well as the functions it 
serves. In the first study of the dissertation I examine age-related deficits in imagining the future, 
remembering the past, and describing the present (Paper 1). These findings replicate known 
deficits in older adults in episodic simulation and memory, yet provide evidence of non-episodic 
processes that also shape their expression. I next examine component cognitive and neural 
processes that are recruited to generate imagined events (Paper 2). Distinct regions of the 
hippocampus were active when encoding, tracking novelty, or constructing imagined events, 
suggesting a multifaceted role of the hippocampus in supporting episodic simulation. Finally, I 
present evidence that episodic simulation and memory can be used to facilitate empathy, that is, 
intentions to help a person in need (Paper 3). People are more willing to help a person in need 
after imagining or remembering helping that individual. Furthermore, the episodic vividness of 
these imagined or remembered events heightened intentions to help. These findings elucidate a 
previously unconsidered mechanism for facilitating empathy, and, in doing so, open the 
possibility for a new functional account of episodic simulation. I close by discussing the promise 	 ﾠ iv	 ﾠ
of this line of work that aims to provide new insights into the relationship between episodic 
simulation, memory, and empathy. 
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Introduction 
Consider the following scenario: While beginning to read this dissertation, the floor drops 
out and you are whisked away in a secret tunnel designed by mad scientists. Taken to a 
subterranean laboratory, the mad scientists use a sophisticated machine to selectively remove all 
your memories of past experiences before returning you to the world above. The consequences 
of losing your ability to remember the past would be devastating. Strip away your memory, and 
all that you hold familiar would become alien and distant. Unable to remember what you were 
thinking moments ago, your career would unravel, family members would appear as strangers, 
the love of your life would seem drained of intimacy, your sense of personal identity would 
mutate. But it gets worse. Strip away your memory, and you would likely be unable to 
effectively plan and carry out actions in the future. Investing for your retirement would appear 
nonsensical, intentions to stay in touch with friends would go unrealized, preparations for the 
arrival of your newborn would be muddled at best, your future would be dim. Unanchored in 
time and place, you would be adrift in an endless sea of the present. Although mad scientists 
running amok erasing memories is fiction, the consequences in everyday life of losing 
memory—and losing your ability to imagine hypothetical future events as a result—are very real.    
Researchers studying memory have long understood the importance of remembering the 
past, but we have only recently begun to discover the importance of imagining the future and its 
close relationship to memory (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Ingvar, 1979, 
1985; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Gaesser, 2013; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Schacter, 
2012; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007; Szpunar, 2010; Tulving, 2002). Deficits in 
remembering past events, previously observed across a wide array of neurological and 
psychiatric disorders, have recently been extended to deficits in imagining the future in these 	 ﾠ 2	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disorders, including Alzheimer’s disease (Addis, Sacchetti, Ally, Budson, & Schacter, 2009), 
amnestic mild cognitive impairment (Gamboz et al., 2010), amnesia (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, 
& Maguire, 2007; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Tulving, 1985), depression (Williams et al., 
1996), post-traumatic stress disorder (Brown et al., 2013), schizophrenia (D’Argembeau, 
Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008), and traumatic brain injury (Rasmussen & Berntsen, in press). 
While more accurately characterizing and improving deficits in imagining events is an 
important objective for developing therapies to address these mental disorders, understanding the 
nature of imagined future events also has implications for healthy individuals. For college 
students, imagining the steps they need to take to study for an impending exam can help them to 
better prepare for—and perform on—the exam (Taylor, Pham, Rifkin, & Armor, 1998). Older 
adults, who report fewer episodic details for imagined future events than do young adults, also 
produce fewer means of effectively solving everyday problems (e.g., moving into a new 
neighborhood, finding a lost watch; Sheldon, McAndrews, & Moscovitch, 2011). Imagining 
future events has even been shown to promote less impulsive and more farsighted decision-
making: imagining receiving a reward in the future attenuated a bias toward selecting more 
immediate but less valuable rewards, in contrast to merely viewing the reward amount and delay 
(Peters & Büchel, 2010), or generating semantic estimates of what the reward could be used to 
purchase (Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011). Indeed, the number of known useful functions in 
everyday life supported by imagining the future is rapidly growing (Gerlach, Spreng, Gilmore, & 
Schacter, 2011; Gollwitzer, 1999; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007, Klein, Robertson, & Delton, 2010, 
2011; Schacter, 2012; Schacter et al., 2012; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Szpunar, 2010). 
Coupled with the growing evidence for a link between remembering the past and imagining the 	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future, the landscape of memory research has started to shift, with increased emphasis on the role 
of memory in supporting future imaginings.  
Amidst this shifting landscape lies this dissertation. I will begin by reviewing the general 
background and theoretical framework that unites my work (Papers 1-3). I will then consider the 
literature specifically motivating each paper. After presenting each paper, I will then discuss the 
broader theoretical, clinical, and applied significance of this dissertation. In closing, I will 
highlight a few outstanding questions that arise from this dissertation, and what I believe will be 
exciting and productive directions for research moving forward.  
Remembering the past to imagine the future: The relationship between episodic memory 
and episodic simulation 
The main emphasis in research on memory is largely focused on identifying the 
mechanisms of encoding, storage, and retrieval (Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011; Gold et al., 2006; 
Johnson, McDuff, Rugg, & Norman, 2009; Liang, Wagner, & Preston, 2013). This mechanistic 
approach has been highly informative, but it leaves unexplained questions regarding the function 
of memory. Fortunately, progress is starting to be made on this front. Partially addressing 
questions concerning adaptive function, researchers have recently begun to examine a key 
benefit of memory deriving from its role in building simulations of hypothetical events set in the 
future. Much of this work has focused on the contributions of remembering specific past events 
(i.e., episodic memory; Tulving, 1972, 1983, 2002) to building such simulations. Throughout this 
dissertation, I will use the term episodic simulation to refer to the imaginative construction of 
hypothetical events in one’s personal future, in line with previous usage (Schacter, Addis, & 
Buckner, 2008; Taylor & Schneider, 1989). It is worth noting that episodic simulation is part of a 
broader category, ‘mental simulation’, which involves disengaging from the external 	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environment in order to mentally project into hypothetical experiences (Buckner & Carroll, 
2007; Morewedge, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2005; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009). However, compared to 
other forms of mental simulation (e.g., perspective taking, spatial navigation), episodic 
simulation uniquely involves a constellation of personal details set in a specific time and place.  
Critically, mounting evidence indicates that episodic memory and episodic simulation depend, to 
a strikingly large extent, on shared cognitive and neural processes.  
Evidence supporting shared processing draws from a variety of empirical approaches. 
Studies from cognitive psychology demonstrate similar subjective experiences of past and future 
events for experimental manipulations of contextual vividness (e.g., imagining an event in a 
familiar setting compared to an unfamiliar setting; Szpunar & McDermott, 2008), emotional 
valence and temporal distance from the present (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Spreng 
& Levine, 2006), and individual differences in emotion regulation strategies, imagery, and self-
defining features important for supporting self-identity (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; 
D’Argembeau, Lardi, & Van der Linden, 2012). The most revealing neuropsychological 
evidence comes from studies on amnesic patients with damage to the hippocampus and related 
structures. Beyond deficits in episodic memory, mounting evidence suggests these patients also 
show impoverished imagination (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007; Klein et al., 2002; 
Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011; Tulving, 1985). Typically, amnesic patients in these studies are 
able to imagine some aspects of personal events, but the phenomenology of the simulations is 
impaired, leading to events with attenuated specificity, vividness, and spatial coherence. 
Hassabis and colleagues (2007) offer evidence of a particularly strong coupling between episodic 
memory and imagination, since the lesions appear to be confined to the hippocampal formation. 
In their study, amnesic patients experienced difficulty constructing imaginary scenes (e.g., 	 ﾠ 5	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imagining lying on a white sandy beach): their imagined scenes contained less content, and the 
content that was generated was less coherent compared to healthy controls (Hassabis, Kumaran, 
Vann, et al., 2007). Although Squire et al. (2010) reasoned that the clinical profiles of these 
patients (e.g., generalized atrophy and seizures) reflect damage outside of the hippocampus, 
Maguire & Hassabis (2011) argued against this interpretation, since the patients performed 
normally on neuropsychological tests (except on tests of memory) and were selected specifically 
for their lesions restricted to the hippocampus. Recently, however, there is some evidence that a 
fully intact hippocampus may not be necessary for episodic simulation. One group of amnesic 
patients with bilateral hippocampal damage but spared remote memories (Squire et al., 2010), an 
adult developmental amnesic patient (Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, & Hassabis, 2010), and 
children with developmental amnesia (Cooper, Vargha-Khadem, Gadian, & Maguire, 2011) can 
construct imaginary scenarios. Notably, these results emerged from the scene construction task 
(Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007), a task that does not strictly require mental time travel 
into the past or future per se, but rather requires participants to merely imagine novel experiences 
in a particular setting (e.g., on a beach, in a museum). These ostensibly conflicting findings leave 
the role of the hippocampus in episodic simulation open for debate, and raise the possibility that 
distinct regions of the hippocampus support different aspects of simulation. For example, one 
possibility is that distinct hippocampal regions support retrieving details from memory, 
recombining these details into coherent events, and encoding these scenarios into memory for 
use in the future. Thus, depending on the lesion site of the hippocampus, different component 
processes of episodic simulation may be differentially affected (Addis & Schacter, 2012; Martin, 
Schacter, Corballis, & Addis, 2011). Neuroimaging research consistently finds a common neural 
network that substantially overlaps with the default network (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Buckner, 	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Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Raichle et al., 2001)—notably, the medial prefrontal and 
parietal cortex, medial temporal lobes (including hippocampus), lateral temporal and parietal 
cortex—underlies remembering past events, imagining future events, and associated forms of 
simulation (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Addis, Roberts, & Schacter, 2011; Okuda et al., 
2003; Spreng et al., 2009; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007; for reviews, see Buckner & 
Carroll, 2007; Schacter et al., 2012; Szpunar, 2010).  
These converging findings from behavioral, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging 
studies form the basis of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Addis & Schacter, 
2012; Schacter & Addis 2007, 2009). The constructive episodic simulation hypothesis proposes 
to explain the shared network for remembering and imagining by contending that episodic 
memories are the raw materials for episodic simulations, and that the flexible nature of memory, 
which renders it vulnerable to false memories, also underlies the recombination of episodic 
details into novel simulations that can be used to adaptively guide future behavior.  
Episodic memory is flexible: a re-construction of past events rather than a verbatim 
reproduction (Bartlett, 1932; Johnson, Suengas, Foley, & Raye, 1988; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; 
Schacter, 1999). Such a flexible system is prone to error, such that people sometimes remember 
experiences that never actually happened (Loftus, 2003). Memory researchers have paid close 
attention to understanding how these errors arise, and for good reason, given the everyday 
consequences of misidentifying a suspect during eyewitness testimony (Loftus, 2005). Yet, 
despite the cost of this flexible, constructive system in sometimes producing distortions, errors, 
and biases, according to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, it also is thought to 
support an adaptive process: the ability to imagine novel hypothetical future events (i.e., episodic 
simulation).  	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ
Episodic simulation is proposed to rely on many of the same cognitive processes as 
episodic memory. In particular, disparate details can be gleaned across remembered past events 
and re-constructed into a novel representation of an imagined future event. This constructive 
system has adaptive benefits for planning and prediction with an emphasis on the benefit of 
enhancing decision-making between alternative choices in novel situations (see Schacter, 2012, 
for a comprehensive review). By simulating possible future events, we can mentally “try out” 
alternative hypothetical scenarios of what might happen, contemplate the outcomes of selecting 
different actions, and winnow our options down to the preferred course of action. Thus, 
imagining hypothetical future events can be used to inform prediction and planning while saving 
the costs of engaging in physical behavior. Physically acting out each hypothetical scenario 
would be exhaustive, cumbersome, and in some cases impossible; for instance, selecting one 
lover over another affords little opportunity to “test” alternative options. Whether hunting for a 
new job, anticipating the arrival of a newborn, or preparing for retirement, the mental flexibility 
to “try out” novel events by imagining the potential outcomes of different actions is thought to 
help guide future decision-making (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Ingvar, 1979; Schacter & Addis, 
2007, 2009; Schacter et al., 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 2005). 
Consistent with this theoretical framework, while both remembering the past and 
imagining the future draw on many of the same cognitive processes, important differences are 
also beginning to emerge (see Schacter et al., 2012 for review). Most notably, additional 
cognitive resources have been proposed to support episodic simulation compared with episodic 
remembering. Since imagining future events is thought to involve recombining more disparate 
details from across experiences than remembering, more intensive constructive (or relational) 	 ﾠ 8	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processing is required to bind and integrate such details into a coherent simulation (Addis & 
Schacter, 2012).  
Building on the foundational studies and theoretical approach above, this dissertation 
consists of three papers that distinguish the contributions of episodic memory from non-episodic 
processes to imagining future events in order to gain a better understanding of the nature of 
episodic simulation, the processes that shape its expression, and the function it serves. 
Specifically, the papers in this dissertation aim to characterize the episodic deficits in older 
adults (Paper 1), delineate intrinsically related processes recruited for imagining future events 
(Paper 2), and explore a novel function of episodic simulation in facilitating prosocial intentions 
(Paper 3).  
Paper 1: Aging and episodic simulation  
Research motivated by the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis has recently 
examined episodic simulation and episodic memory in cognitive aging. As people age, episodic 
memory declines in various ways (e.g., Craik & Salthouse, 2000). Many studies have 
documented age-related deficits using word lists or similar materials encoded in the laboratory, 
while less work has investigated the finding that older adults also provide less specific memories 
of past experiences for everyday events compared to young adults. Supporting evidence for this 
point has been provided by research using the Autobiographical Interview (AI) (Levine, 
Svoboda, Hay, Wincour, & Moscovitch, 2002). For the AI protocol, older and younger adults 
recalled specific personal past events in response to probes concerning different periods over the 
lifespan (e.g., events from early childhood to events from the previous year). Subjects were 
provided with 5 minutes to recall individual experiences, and their descriptions of the events 
were transcribed and then segmented into episodic or “internal” details (e.g., who, what, when, 	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and where details) and “external” details (e.g., semantic information, other external events, 
repetitions). Levine et al. (2002) showed that the episodic specificity of older adults’ 
autobiographical memories was impoverished compared with those provided by young adult; 
older adults produced fewer internal and more external details during the AI than did young 
adults.   
A natural question that arises in response to these findings from the perspective of the 
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis is whether or not the reduced episodic specificity for 
remembered past events would extend to imagined future events. Since the hypothesis specifies a 
large degree of overlap between the processes supporting episodic memory and episodic 
simulation, it predicts a similar age-related decline in episodic specificity for imagined future 
events.  
Addis, Wong, and Schacter (2008) evaluated this hypothesis using an adapted version of 
the AI. In their study, older and young adults remembered or imagined events in response to 
word cues, generating as much detail as possible within three minutes. Replicating the findings 
of Levine et al. (2002), older adults produced fewer internal and more external details than 
young adults for remembered past events. Critically, the same pattern was observed for imagined 
future events. These results and those of a follow-up study that yielded similar results with a 
different experimental paradigm (Addis, Musicaro, Pan, & Schacter, 2010) are consistent with 
the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis; however, since the AI consists of generating 
narratives (i.e., verbal reports about experiences), the age-related differences in memory and 
imagination could be explained by deficits in a number of non-episodic processes related to the 
production of narrative discourse. This possibility is especially a concern because the linguistics 
literature has shown that older adults often possess different narrative goals and produce more 	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off-topic speech than do younger adults (James, Burke, Austin, & Hulme, 1998; Schacter, 
Gaesser, & Addis, 2010, 2013; Trunk & Abrams, 2009). Differences in narrative style could 
account for changes in specificity if older adults possess different communicative goals than 
young adults, focusing on personal meaning rather than exact recapitulation of details (Arbuckle 
& Gold, 1993, Coupland & Coupland, 1995). Another possible explanation is that a general 
decline in the ability to inhibit task-irrelevant thought leads to older adults generating more off-
topic details (Zacks & Hasher, 1994). Although Paper 1 of this thesis proposal was not designed 
to directly distinguish between these non-episodic processes, it does attempt to distinguish more 
broadly between episodic and non-episodic contributions to remembering and imagining 
personal events. In two experiments, Paper 1 evaluates whether the detail deficits observed for 
episodic simulation and episodic memory extend to descriptions (i.e., verbal reports) of pictures 
for everyday scenes—a task that does not explicitly rely on episodic memory processes, since the 
picture is presented in front of the participant for the duration of the trial. The constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis predicts that age-related deficits in episodic simulation and 
memory will be attributed to impairments in episodic processes. In other words, picture 
description performance associated with broader non-episodic factors such as descriptive ability 
or communicative goals will not fully account for age-related differences in episodic simulation 
and memory. Alternatively, age-related differences may reflect the operation of these non-
episodic factors. As described in Paper 1, this line of work stands to provide a greater 
understanding of age-related decline in episodic simulation and memory of healthy older adults 
and has implications for better characterizing and improving deficits in pathological older adults, 
beginning to reveal the link between episodic processes and higher-order non-episodic factors 
that shape its expression. 	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
Paper 2: Component processes of episodic simulation 
Paper 2, like Paper 1, reports an attempt to gain a better understanding of the underlying 
cognitive processes that support episodic simulation. However, whereas Paper 1 examines the 
shared cognitive processes between episodic simulation and episodic memory using behavioral 
methods, Paper 2 investigates processes that are preferentially recruited for episodic simulation 
using functional MRI. 
Although episodic simulation and episodic memory rely on a strikingly similar network 
of brain regions, several regions within this network (including the hippocampus) have 
consistently shown greater activity for imagining future events compared to remembering past 
events. Particularly puzzling for researchers has been interpreting activity in the hippocampus 
that is greater for imagining compared to remembering, because this region is traditionally 
considered to fundamentally support episodic memory (see Addis & Schacter, 2012 for review). 
One explanation for this pattern of results is that the simulation-preferential hippocampal 
activation reflects more intensive constructive processing, that is, recombining details gleaned 
across disparate episodic memories into a coherent novel scenario (Schacter & Addis, 2007). 
According to this view, while both episodic simulation and episodic memory require the retrieval 
of stored details, imagination involves the additional process of flexibly integrating details into a 
novel scenario.  
Supporting evidence comes from studies that have observed greater hippocampal activity 
when the degree of constructive processing is increased by appropriate experimental 
manipulations. For example, Weiler, Suchan, and Daum (2010) observed greater hippocampal 
activity when subjects imagined future events that had a lower probability of occurring compared 
to a higher probability. Lower probability events are thought to require greater recombinatory 	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processing, since lower probability events involve increased demands to bind together disparate 
details than do high probability events that have already been planned. Similarly, Addis and 
Schacter (2008) showed activity in the hippocampus that was preferentially driven by degree of 
imagined detail: the more detailed an imagined event was, the greater the hippocampal activity. 
Furthermore, constructing more episodic (specific) future events, compared to general (routine) 
future events, also increased hippocampal activity. The former task requires greater 
recombination of episodic details relative to the latter task, which draws more on conceptual 
knowledge (Addis, Cheng, Roberts, & Schacter, 2011). Such convergent findings suggest that 
the disruption of the hippocampus may engender deficits in imagining future events. Findings 
from neuropsychological patients lend some support to this hypothesis.  
As noted earlier, amnesic patients have been reported with impaired ability to imagine 
coherent scenes and future events (Tulving, 1985; Klein et al., 2002, Hassibis, Kumaran, Vann, 
et al., 2007; Race et al., 2011). Patient K. C. exhibited dense autobiographical amnesia that 
extended to an inability to imagine specific future events (Tulving, 1985). Patient D. B. also 
exhibited a parallel deficit across memory and simulation, unable to remember or imagine 
personal events (Klein et al., 2002). Extra-hippocampal damage is known to exist in patient K.C. 
and may exist in patient D.B., and so strong claims regarding the role of the hippocampus and 
function it serves cannot be discerned from these patients alone. More recent work, however, has 
attempted to focus on patients with damage thought to be restricted to the hippocampus. For 
example, Hassabis et al. (2007) found that four out of five amnesic patients produced 
significantly less content when imagining scenarios of everyday scenes compared to healthy 
controls (e.g., lying on a beach, standing in a museum). 	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
Although the selectivity of lesions in these patients has been called into question based on 
the patients’ clinical profiles (Squire et al., 2010), other researchers have observed evidence 
consistent with the notion that damage to the hippocampus and episodic memory retrieval is 
sufficient to disrupt episodic simulation. For instance, the one patient from a study by Race et al. 
(2011) who had confirmed damage restricted to the hippocampus was similarly impaired when 
imagining future events compared to patients with extra-hippocampal temporal lobe damage. 
Although a number of cases of developmental amnesic patients with a relatively preserved 
ability to imagine events have been documented (Maguire et al., 2010; Hurley, Maguire, & 
Vargha-Khadem, 2011; Cooper et al., 2011), these patients incurred damage early in life. 
Consequently, it is possible that they developed compensatory strategies to generate imagined 
scenarios. Overall, these findings are beginning to establish a consensus that memory retrieval 
fundamentally underlies episodic simulation. Without the ability retrieve past events, people are 
unable to use episodic details as building blocks to assemble imagined future event. Less 
agreement has been reached concerning the role of the hippocampus in supporting a flexible 
recombination process.  
If the hippocampus’ contribution to episodic simulation supports a recombination process 
in addition to memory retrieval, then one would not expect cases of patients with damage to the 
hippocampus and a preserved ability to imagine coherent future events. However, patients with 
selective memory impairments capable of imagining future events have recently been observed. 
Squire et al. (2010) examined a group of patients with damage circumscribed to the 
hippocampus. These patients exhibited a minimal degree of retrograde amnesia with a seemingly 
preserved ability to imagine detailed future events (but see Andelman, Hoofen, Goldberg, 
Aizenstein, & Neufeld, 2010). Since these patients could retrieve remote past events and only 	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ
showed mild (non-significant) deficits in recent past events, these results could be viewed as 
supporting the idea that retrieval of past events is necessary for imagining novel events. The 
results also suggest that access to the past is sufficient to account for the role of the hippocampus 
in imagining events and there is no need to evoke the additional process of recombination in 
order to generate coherent and meaningful scenarios. What is to be made of these inconsistencies 
in the literature? 
One way of reconciling the discrepancies across neuroimaging and patient studies is if 
distinct regions within the hippocampus support separate component processes underlying 
episodic simulation (Addis & Schacter, 2012). This multifaceted account proposes that the 
hippocampus supports three distinct—but related—processes that contribute to imagining future 
events: retrieving episodic details, recombining details into coherent and meaningful scenarios, 
and encoding the newly formed scenarios to help guide future decision making. In this way, 
damage to one aspect of the hippocampus could leave the other processes intact thereby giving 
rise to differential patterns of impairment in hippocampal patients depending on the location of 
the damage. Elucidating the precise contribution of episodic memory to episodic simulation 
requires teasing apart these related component processes.  
It may be particularly difficult to isolate a constructive recombination process from 
processes related to encoding novel events, because the functional utility of imagining future 
events is to imagine novel events that a person has not already experienced. Thus, previous 
comparisons of episodic memory and episodic simulation were confounded by associative 
novelty. That is, retrieving disparate episodic details into a new combination entails more novel 
associations compared to retrieving details that were previously associated within an episode. 
Given the known role of the hippocampus in encoding novel events (e.g., Schacter & Wagner, 	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1999) and novelty detection (e.g., Kumaran & Maguire, 2007), the imagination-preferential 
hippocampal activity may in fact reflect novelty-related processing rather than detail 
recombination. Consistent with this possibility, Addis et al. (2011) found that specific future 
events, which were thought to involve more constructive processing than general future events, 
also contained higher levels of subjective novelty; this confounding of constructive processing 
and novelty made it difficult to attribute hippocampal activity in that study to either 
recombination or novelty per se. Further weakening the notion of a hippocampal recombination 
process, a recent study by Martin et al. (2011) found that the activity of regions in the 
hippocampus that had previously shown an imagination-greater-than-memory effect was directly 
modulated by subsequent memory performance. However, there was some evidence of a 
recombination-specific process, in that the pattern of functional connectivity between the 
hippocampus and other default network regions suggested hippocampus activity could not be 
fully accounted for by encoding effects. What is needed, then, is a means of independently 
manipulating encoding and recombination processes while controlling for novelty-related 
processing. Currently, it remains an open question as to which specific component processes 
drive activity in the hippocampus during episodic simulation. An issue of considerable 
theoretical importance is whether the hippocampus underlies a recombination process that 
supports imagining future events, or whether only processes such as encoding and novelty 
detection are preferentially engaged by imagining compared to remembering. To isolate the 
contributions of the hippocampus to imagining future events, in Paper 2 we drew on 
experimental recombination (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009), subsequent memory 
(Wagner et al., 1998), and task switching paradigms (Duncan, Ketz, Inati, & Davachi, 2012) in 
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apart a constructive recombination process from alternative interpretations of hippocampal 
activity observed during episodic simulation (i.e., encoding novel experiences, detecting changes 
in the environment). 
Paper 3: Constructing empathic events 
Papers 1 and 2 both aim to identify and delineate aspects of the cognitive architecture 
supporting episodic simulation. Paper 3 takes a slightly different approach. Rather than focus on 
the underlying mechanisms, Paper 3 investigates how these mechanisms can be leveraged in a 
social decision-making context, and, in doing so, explores a previously unconsidered function of 
episodic simulation: facilitating prosocial intentions to help others. 
Empathy—a willingness or intention to help others—and prosocial behavior are 
hallmarks of our species and essential for mental health (Melis & Semman, 2010; Nowak & 
Highfield, 2011; Rand, Green, & Nowak, 2012; Wilson, 2000; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). Empathy 
is a multifacted construct used to describe a variety of concepts in psychology and neuroscience. 
The prominent social psychologist Daniel Batson (2011) acknowledged no less than seven 
different uses of the term “empathy”, including accurately perceiving another person’s internal 
state (de Waal 1996; Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Tomasello & Call, 1997), projecting what 
another person is thinking and feeling (i.e., perspective taking; Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; 
Davis, 1994; Stotland, 1969), and feeling distress at witnessing another person’s suffering 
(Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981; Hoffman, 1981). Although providing an in-depth 
review of each of these uses is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I mention them so as to 
explicitly (i) recognize diversity and complexity in the field, (ii), acknowledge that these states—
although distinct—could interact, and (iii) clarify my own use of the term by contrast. 	 ﾠ 17	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Accordingly, in this dissertation I use the term “empathy” to mean a prosocial motivation or 
intention to help others (Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). 
While our capacity to work with and help others in need is a central aspect of human 
social life (Adolphs, 1999; Dunbar, 1998; Rand et al., 2012; Nowak & Highfield, 2011), 
instances of empathic failure also abound (Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011). This failure is 
particularly evident when the people in need are from stigmatized groups (e.g., the diseased or 
destitute) or are competitors (Batson, Polycarpou, et al., 1997; Batson, Chang, & Rowland, 2002; 
Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006). Social psychologists and neuroscientists have largely 
emphasized how adopting the thoughts and feelings (i.e., perspective-taking, akin to mentalizing 
and theory of mind) of the person in need supports our prosocial tendencies (Batson, Early, et al., 
1997; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Decety, 2005; Mathur, Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010; 
Waytz, Zaki, & Mitchell, 2012). Much of this research suggests that adopting the perspective of 
a person in need may heighten our awareness of his pain and suffering, eliciting emotional 
concern that then prompts us to help. Little attention, however, has been given to the potential 
impact of episodic simulation and memory on empathic responses (see Gaesser, 2013 for 
review). Are people more willing to lend a helping hand when they imagine doing so in the 
future (i.e., episodic simulation) or when they remember doing so in the past (i.e., episodic 
memory)?  
Determining willingness to help in any meaningful sense requires a person to reflect on 
the perceived probability that he or she will act. Currently there is no direct evidence for the 
impact of episodic processes on empathy. However, there is relevant work from the memory and 
social judgment literatures that offers some insight. In reaction to the controversy on the veracity 
of traumatic memories recovered during therapy that employed guided imagery techniques, 	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ
researchers began investigating the effect of imagining on memory distortion (Garry & 
Polaschek, 2000). These studies on imagination inflation showed that imagining a novel event 
increases the perceived likelihood that it occurred in one’s past, and in some cases produces 
“implanted” rich false memories of events that never happened (Hyman & Pentland, 1996; 
Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). In one illustrative study, subjects rated how confident they were that 
a list of possible childhood events had occurred, imagined a subset of these events two weeks 
later, and were then asked to re-rate their confidence that the childhood events occurred under 
the guise that the researcher had misplaced the original ratings (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & 
Sherman, 1996). Subjects’ confidence ratings that an event had occurred in their personal pasts 
were inflated after imagining an experience compared with a non-imagined experience. This line 
of research suggests that imagining events can impact the perceived probability that an event 
occurred in the past, but if the power of imagining is to be harnessed to increase prosociality, 
then its impact will need to run in the other temporal direction: the future. 
Social psychologists have studied how imagining hypothetical experiences increases the 
perceived probability that the experience will occur in the future (Anderson, 1983; Carroll, 1978; 
Greenwald, Carnot, Beach, & Young, 1987; Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 
1985). Typically, memory distortion researchers view the consequences of imagination inflation 
as harmful, yet this approach was partially informed by studies on prediction in social judgment 
that elucidated more benign effects of imagining events. Investigating decision-making 
heuristics, Carroll (1978) initially documented the influence of imagined events on predictions, 
finding that imagining events related to a presidential victory increased the likelihood that the 
imagined victor would win. Importantly, the impact of imagining events has also been extended 
to actual voting behavior (Libby, Shaeffer, Eibach, & Slemmer, 2007), and in some cases, can 	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predict behavioral effects two to three months after initially imagining an experience (Gregory, 
Cialdini, & Carpenter, 1982).  
More recent work from memory researchers has shown that repeatedly imagining an 
emotional event increases estimates of the perceived plausibility that the imagined event will 
occur in the future (Szpunar & Schacter, 2013). Although the effect of episodic simulation on 
helping an individual in need has not been examined, several studies have used imagination to 
promote socially desirable attitudes and behaviors, including reducing dropout rates for clinical 
treatment (Sherman & Anderson, 1987) and increasing intentions to donate blood (Anderson, 
1983; Armitage & Reidy, 2008) 
Further evidence suggesting that imagined events could be used to facilitate prosocial 
intentions comes from work on intergroup interactions. Although empathy is pervasive, when the 
suffering person is from a social, racial, or cultural outgroup, empathy can be reduced or absent 
(Cikara et al., 2011). One of the most effective techniques for attenuating outgroup bias has been 
positive intergroup contact. Under the right conditions, contact between members from different 
groups lessens intergroup hostility and prejudice while heightening positive intergroup attitudes 
(Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Although contact with outgroup members may be 
ideal for attenuating outgroup bias, it has practical limitations. Namely, the opportunity for face-
to-face contact may be unavailable where it is needed the most, as is the case for highly 
segregated groups. But does the outgroup member need to be physically present to improve 
intergroup attitudes, or might this hurdle be overcome by merely imagining contact with 
outgroup members? Recent research suggests that the prosocial benefits of contact can also be 
reaped through imagined social contact. Imagining a positive social interaction with an outgroup 	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member can improve intergroup attitudes and reduce prejudice (Crisp & Turner, 2009; Turner, 
Crisp, & Lambert, 2007).  
Although a useful tool for flexibly improving intergroup relations, imagined contact is 
unlikely to be as effective as person-to-person contact (Turner et al., 2007), as direct experiences 
produce stronger attitudes than indirect experiences (e.g. Fazio, Powell, & Herr, 1983). One 
plausible explanation for this difference may be that knowledge accessed through perception is 
more cognitively available compared to knowledge accessed through imagined events (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973). As an imagined event more closely resembles perception (i.e., is more 
vivid in the mind’s eye), the event is brought to mind more easily, and thereby more strongly 
weighted as diagnostic knowledge that guides judgments of event plausibility (Anderson, 1983; 
Crisp, Husnu, Meleady, Stathi, & Turner, 2010).  
Would increasing the vividness of an imagined intergroup interaction enhance intentions 
to interact with outgroup members? Indeed, previous research on intergroup contact has shown 
that instructing participants to imagine specifically when and where they would positively 
interact with unfamiliar others led to greater intentions to interact with unfamiliar others
 (Husnu 
& Crisp, 2010). Notably, specific temporal (when) and contextual (where) contexts represent two 
defining features of episodic experiences
 (Tulving, 2002). Furthermore, vividness predicted 
willingness to interact, independent of changes in attitude and anxiety. As the vividness of an 
imagined event increased, people were more willing to interact with others.  
Although my focus has been on discussing relevant behavioral studies that point to a 
possible effect of episodic processes on empathy, I will briefly note some relevant—though more 
tentative—work from neuroscience. The neuroscience of episodic memory and simulation on the 
one hand, and empathy on the other, have mostly advanced in parallel with little intersection 	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between these two lines of investigation. However, evidence across experiments indicates there 
may be overlap between the brain networks that support episodic processes and empathy 
(Gaesser, 2013). To the degree that specific cognitive faculties can be localized to particular 
brain regions (Henson, 2005), this overlap reflects contributions of one cognitive process to 
another (e.g. episodic processes informing empathic processes) or component processes recruited 
across cognitive processes (e.g. self-referential processing recruited for both episodic processes 
and empathy). Co-morbid deficits in episodic processes and empathy have been observed in 
patient populations such as those with autism spectrum disorder (Lombardo, Barnes, 
Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2007) and schizophrenia (Corcoran & Frith, 2003; Lee, Farrow, 
Spence, & Woodruff, 2004), consistent with the notion that episodic memory and simulation 
may contribute to supporting empathy. 
Evidence from neuroimaging studies also points to a possible neural overlap between 
episodic processes and empathy. Several of the same brain regions forming a common core 
network (commonly referred to as the default network) that supports remembering past events 
and imagining future events and related processes are also recruited during tasks that elicit 
empathy (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Buckner et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2009; Schacter et al., 2012). In 
particular, activity in the precuneus and medial prefrontal cortex has been shown to be 
preferentially recruited when observing a person in need (Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011; 
Mathur et al., 2010). And, in some cases, activity in these regions has even predicted prosocial 
behavior (Masten et al., 2011; Rameson, Morelli, & Lieberman, 2012; Waytz et al., 2012). 
Because similar regions are activated when remembering and imagining, an intriguing possibility 
is that episodic processes could affect empathy through these same neural mechanisms (e.g., self-	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referential processing)—though such interpretive logic should be met with caution in the absence 
of direct empirical investigation. 
Perhaps the most tantalizing neuroscience data consistent with a link between episodic 
processes and empathy comes from a study showing empathic deficits in amnesic patients 
(Beadle, Tranel, Cohen, & Duff, 2013). Amnesic patients, suffering damage to the medial 
temporal lobe, displayed lower levels of trait empathy, were less responsive to empathy 
inductions, and were less prosocial in a social-economic context (e.g., the Dictator Game) 
compared to healthy controls. The authors of this study interpreted these empathic deficits as 
evidence that retrieving past events contributes to inferring the mental states of another person 
(i.e., perspective taking), similar to previous interpretations of the relationship between memory 
and social cognition (Rabin & Rosenbaum, 2012; Perry, Hendler, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). This 
account proposes that recalling past experiences can serve as a guide in predicting the mental 
state of another person, which in turn promotes empathy. Thus, in this way, the effect of episodic 
processes on empathy is thought to be mediated by perspective taking. However, an alternative 
interpretation is that accessing episodic representations directly affects judgments in social 
decision-making context rather than being mediated by theory of mind or perspective taking by 
serving as diagnostic knowledge that guides judgments about future actions to help. At present, 
the underlying cognitive mechanisms remain obscure. Nevertheless, when taken as a whole, the 
findings from imagination inflation, imagined intergroup contact, and social neuroscience 
literatures suggest episodic processes could be used to facilitate empathy. 
To begin to investigate a possible effect of episodic processes on empathy, I developed 
and ran three experiments in my last year of graduate school using a novel paradigm that 
combines a theoretical approach and manipulations from cognitive psychology with dependent 	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measures from social psychology (Paper 3). Previous work has suggested that the adaptive 
benefit of episodic simulation and memory lies in guiding planning and prediction. The novel 
hypothesis proposed here is that episodic simulation and memory can also be harnessed to 
enhance empathy and, in turn, prosocial behavior. Thus, this work posits a previously 
unconsidered function of episodic simulation and memory: fostering empathy and prosocial 
behavior. 
 
In sum, the landscape of research on memory is shifting of late with an emerging 
literature on memory’s contribution to episodic simulation beginning to take shape. Researchers 
have already made substantial empirical headway, yet the precise cognitive and neural processes 
that guide simulation require further investigation. Moreover, although the importance of 
episodic simulation in shaping our everyday lives is continuing to elicit increased attention from 
researchers, almost no attention has been paid to a potential role of episodic simulation in 
supporting and enhancing the unique prosocial tendencies of our species. In three papers, this 
dissertation aims to further illuminate the cognitive processes that underlie episodic simulation 
and the functions it serves. Paper 1 characterizes age-related changes in remembering the past, 
imagining the future, and describing the present. Paper 2 delineates intrinsically related 
component cognitive and neural processes that contribute to imagining novel events. Paper 3 
explores the role of imagining and remembering in facilitating prosocial intentions to help people 
in need.  
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Gaesser, B., Sacchetti, D. C., Addis, D. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2011). Characterizing age-related 
changes in remembering the past and imagining the future. Psychology and Aging, 26, 80-84.  
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Abstract 
 
When remembering past events or imagining possible future events, older adults generate 
fewer episodic details than do younger adults. These results support the constructive episodic 
simulation hypothesis: deficits in retrieving episodic details underlie changes during memory and 
imagination. To examine the extent of this age-related reduction in specificity, we compared 
performance on memory and imagination tasks to a picture description task that does not require 
episodic memory. In two experiments, older adults exhibited comparable specificity reductions 
across all conditions. These findings emphasize the need to consider age-related changes in 
imagination and memory in a broader theoretical context. 
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Characterizing age-related changes in remembering the past and imagining the future 
During the past several years, converging evidence from cognitive psychology,  
neuropsychology, and neuroimaging has documented that episodic memory – a neurocognitive 
system that supports recollection of personal experiences (Tulving, 2002) – also plays an 
important role in imagining or simulating future experiences (for recent reviews, see Schacter et 
al., 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Szpunar, 2010).  Addis et al. (2008) extended this line 
of research to cognitive aging. Addis et al. (2008) used an adapted version of the 
Autobiographical Interview, a protocol developed by Levine et al. (2002) that segments 
individuals’ descriptions of experiences into episodic or “internal” details (e.g., who, what, 
when, and where details) and “external” details (e.g., semantic information, other external 
events, repetitions).  Levine et al. (2002) found that older adults produced fewer internal and 
more external details than did younger adults when recalling past autobiographical events.  
In the Addis et al. (2008) experiment, older adults remembered past experiences or 
imagined future events in response to word cues, providing as much detail as possible for three 
minutes per episode. Replicating Levine et al. (2002), older adults provided fewer internal 
(episodic) details and more external (semantic) details than did younger adults when 
remembering the past. Importantly, Addis et al. (2008) documented a parallel aging deficit for 
imagining future events: older adults provided fewer internal details and more external details 
than did younger adults (see also, Addis, et al., 2010). Addis et al. (2008) interpreted these 
results as support for the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 2007), 
which maintains that both remembering the past and imagining the future are supported by a 
constructive episodic memory system that is capable of flexibly recombining elements of prior 
experiences into simulations of future events. However, because the Autobiographical Interview 	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involves producing an extended narrative, differences between young and old adults in memory 
and imagination on the Autobiographical Interview could also reflect age deficits in non-episodic 
mechanisms.  
To address this issue, we report two experiments that include a condition absent from 
previous studies using the Autobiographical Interview. Older and younger adults were instructed 
to describe a complex picture of a natural scene in as much detail as possible. The key question 
is whether the pattern previously observed for memory and imagination –reduced internal and 
increased external for older adults relative to young- also extends to a picture description task 
that does not require episodic memory.  
Experiment 1 
  Experiment 1 examines imagination for personal events relative to description of events 
presented in a picture - a condition in which access to episodic memory is not required for task 
performance.  
Method 
Participants  
  Sixteen healthy younger adults (age, 18-35 years, M = 24.00 years, 8 female) and sixteen 
older adults (age, 65-88 years M = 74.21 years, 10 female) with no history of neurological 
impairments participated in this study. All subjects had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Older adults also performed normally on the Mini-Mental State Examination (M = 28.75, SD 
=1.44). Older adults had on average completed more years of education than had younger adults, 
but the difference did not attain statistical significance (Older: M=16.25 years, SD=3.38; 
Younger: M=14.56, SD=1.89; p=.09. 
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Stimuli and Design 
  The study stimuli consisted of 12 colored photographs that depicted people engaged in a 
particular activity or set of activities. Successful generation of events was encouraged by 
selecting activities that both age groups could relate to; for example, lounging on a beach, 
enjoying a picnic in a park, or dance reception. For the duration of each trial, a picture (size, 964 
x 734 pixels) was displayed on a computer with the relevant task instructions (Describe or 
Imagine). Trials were blocked by condition to reduce cognitive load and facilitate older adults’ 
comprehension of instructions. Presentation order of conditions was counterbalanced across 
subjects. Each condition included 2 practice trials and 4 experimental trials, consistent with our 
previous work with older adults using the Autobiographical Interview (Addis et al., 2008, 2010). 
Autobiographical Interview 
  For each trial, participants completed an adapted version of Autobiographical Interview: 
they either described details about a picture or imagined an event using the picture as the general 
setting. General prompts were given when necessary to clarify instructions or solicit further 
details. For description trials, participants were required to describe the different people, objects, 
and environment in the picture and their relationship to one another (e.g. What are the people 
doing? What do they look like? Where are they?). Participants were instructed to report only 
what was literally depicted in the picture without embellishing. For imagination trials, 
participants imagined events that could possibly occur in the next few years with the picture as 
the general setting. Imagined experiences did not need to strictly involve the elements presented 
in the picture, so that participants would successfully generate an event. Events were restricted to 
the future few years, because the advanced age of some older adults meant they could not 
generate events far into the future. Participants were instructed to experience events from a field 	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perspective (through their own eyes) rather than from an observer perspective (from an external 
vantage point). Events generated for imagination trials were required to be specific in time and 
place, lasting several minutes to hours, but not exceeding a day. In all tasks, participants 
recounted as many details as possible for 3 minutes per picture.  
Scoring 
  Consistent with previous studies of memory and imagination, we adapted the 
conventional Autobiographical Interview protocol developed by Levine et al. (2002) to 
systematically parse details in all tasks. Coders were assessed for interrater reliability on the 
basis of an intraclass correlation analysis for scores of 20 responses collected from previous 
studies, two-way mixed model; standardized Cronbach’s α = .92 for internal Autobiographical 
Interview scores and .85 for external scores). Importantly, the principal coder was blind to the 
hypotheses of this study so as to avoid a potential confirmation bias. For imagination trials, the 
central event was identified; if more than one event was mentioned, the event discussed in more 
detail was designated the central event. For the description trials, any perceptual detail that 
depicted elements in the picture as it was presented was considered part of the central event. 
Then the transcription was segmented into distinct details (e.g. unique chunks of information), 
and these details were categorized as internal (episodic detail relevant to the central event) or 
external (semantic details, repetitions, and irrelevant episodic details). While verbatim 
descriptions of items taken directly from the picture were scored as internal details for 
description trials, they were scored as external details for imagination trials, so that only actually 
imagined events counted toward internal details on imagination trials.  Inferences about the 
picture (e.g. speculating about the temperature, providing explanations for peoples’ actions) were 	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scored as external details for description trials. Coders referenced the appropriate pictures to 
classify details internal or external.  
Results 
  We assessed age-related differences in picture description and imagination by conducting 
a mixed factorial 2 (Age: Young, Old) x 2 (Task: Describe, Imagine) x 2 (Detail: Internal, 
External) ANOVA. We found a significant main effect of Age, with older adults producing 
overall fewer details than did younger adults, F(1,30) = 17.31, p < .01, η
2 = .36, as well as a 
significant main effect for detail, indicating more internal than external details were provided 
across age and task F(1,30) = 130.47, p < .01, η
2 = .81. There was significant main effect of 
Task, reflecting more detail generated in the picture description condition than the imagination 
condition, F(1,30) = 34.82, p < .01, η
2 = .537. These main effects were qualified by a significant 
Age x Detail interaction: older adults generated fewer internal details and more external details, 
F(1,30) = 24.48, p < .01, η
2 = .45, compared with young adults (Figure 1.1A). No Age x Task 
(F(1,30) = .45, p = .51, η
2 = .015) or Age x Task x Detail (F(1,30) = .01, p = .97, η
2 = .00) 
interactions were observed. The finding that older adults produced fewer internal details than did 
young adults indicated an age-related deficit in episodic specificity consistent with previous 
findings.  	 ﾠ 31	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Figure 1.1 A) Mean number of internal and external details for Exp. 1 as a function of Age 
(Young, Old) and Task (Picture Description, Imagination). Error bars represent standard errors 
of the means. B) Mean number of internal and external details for Exp. 2 as a function of Age 
(Young, Old) and Task (Picture Description, Imagination, Memory). Error bars represent 
standard errors of the means. 
 
  To further evaluate the contribution of aging to reduced episodic specificity of 
imagination performance, we conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis with episodic 
(internal) detail of imagined events as the dependent variable and picture description 
performance (internal details) and age as predictors. After entering picture description 
performance into the model, age-related performance in the imagination condition was loaded. 
The analysis revealed that number of internal details provided in the picture description 	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condition was a significant predictor of number of internal details provided in the imagination 
condition, R
2 = .455,  F(1,30) = 25.01, p < .001.  When age was added in the second step, it 
predicted a significant but relatively small amount of variance in number of details provided in 
the imagination condition, R
2 change = .13, F(1,30) = 9.09, p < .01. The hierarchical multiple 
regression thus showed that, while relatively weak, there was an age-related deficit in 
imagination that could not be attributed to general descriptive ability. 
Experiment 2 
  Experiment 1 yielded three key results. First, using pictorial cues in the imagination 
condition, we replicated previous findings in studies using word cues that older adults produce 
fewer internal and more external details than younger adults (Addis et al., 2008, 2010). Second, 
we extended this pattern to a picture description task that does not require episodic memory. 
Third, we found that while picture description performance was a significant predictor of 
imagination performance, age accounted for some variance in imagination performance, above 
and beyond picture description performance. In Experiment 2, we attempted to determine 
whether a) the key results from Experiment 1 could be replicated, and b) they extend to an 
autobiographical memory condition in addition to picture description and imagination 
conditions. Including an autobiographical memory condition should allow us to observe whether 
the small age-related deficit in imagination we found would remain after controlling for decline 
in episodic specificity of general descriptive ability and remembering personal experiences. 
Method 
Participants  
  Fifteen healthy younger adults (age, 19-35 years, M = 25.00 years, 5 female) and fifteen 
older adults (age, 65-88 years M = 74.08 years, 6 female) with no history of neurological 	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impairment participated in this study. All subjects had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Older adults also performed normally on the Mini-Mental State Examination (M = 28.93, SD 
=3.21). Older and younger adults completed a similar number of years of education, (Older: 
M=16.4 years, SD=32.35; Younger: M=15.47, SD=1.85; p=.23. 
Stimuli, Design, Autobiographical Interview, and Scoring   
Six color photographs were added to the stimuli used in Experiment 1, consisting of the 
same parameters as the original photographs.   Procedures for Experiment 2 were the same as in 
Experiment 1, but with the addition of an autobiographical memory condition. Memory trials 
involved remembering a personal event that occurred in the last few years (versus the next few 
years for imagined events) using the picture as a cue to help focus on an event. Participants were 
instructed to remember events related to the contents of the picture, but events did not need to 
strictly consist of the exact situation depicted in the picture. Memories were required to be 
specific in time and place, lasting several minutes to hours, but not exceeding a day. Participants 
were instructed to experience events from a field perspective rather than from an observer 
perspective. Scoring for description and imagination trials was the same as in Experiment 1, and 
memory trials were scored according to Autobiographical Interview protocol in a similar manner 
to imagination trials from Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, each condition included 2 practice 
trials and 4 experimental trials. Trials were blocked by condition, and presentation order of 
conditions was counterbalanced across subjects.  
Results 
  We assessed age-related differences in picture description, memory, and imagination by 
conducting a mixed factorial 2 (Age: Young, Old) x 3 (Task: Describe, Remember, Imagine) 2 
(Detail: Internal, External) ANOVA. Once again, we found significant main effects of Age 	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F(1,28) = 8.44, p < .01, η
2 = .232, and Detail, F(1,28) = 124.78, p < .01, η
2 = .817,  qualified by 
an interaction: compared with younger adults, on the imagination, memory, and picture 
description tasks, older adults generated fewer internal details and more external details F(1,28) 
= 15.01, p < .01, η
2 = .349 (Figure 1.1B). There was also a significant main effect for Task, 
F(1,28) = 26.05, p < .01, η
2 = .482. Post hoc Bonferroni corrected pairwise t-test revealed that 
more details were generated for picture description than memory or imagination, p < .025. No 
Age x Task interaction (F(1,28) = 1.04, p = .36, η
2 = .04) or Age x Task x Detail interaction 
(F(1,28) = 3.63, p = .07, η
2 = .16) was found. 
  To assess the contribution of aging to imagination and memory performance beyond a 
general ability to describe events, we conducted two hierarchical multiple regression analyses; 
one with episodic (internal) detail in the imagination condition as the dependent variable and 
picture description performance (internal details) and age as predictors, the other with episodic 
(internal) details in the memory condition as the dependent variable and picture description 
performance (internal details) and age as predictors. Consistent with the first experiment, our 
analysis revealed that the number of internal details produced in the picture description condition 
was a significant predictor of internal details produced in the imagination condition, R
2 = .737,  
F(1,28) = 78.343, p < .001.  When age was added in the second step, it significantly (though 
modestly) improved the model’s capacity to account for variance in the imagination condition, 
R
2 change = .09, F(1,28) = 14.126, p < .001. Similarly, for the second hierarchical regression 
model, number of internal details in the picture description condition was also a significant 
predictor of internal details in the memory condition, R
2 = .783,  F(1,28) = 44.317, p < .001. 
When age was added as a predictor of internal details in the memory condition it significantly –
but again only modestly- improved, R
2 change = .123, F(1,28) = 13.877, p < .001. Of theoretical 	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interest is whether an aging imagination deficit remains above and beyond both a difference in 
descriptive ability and deficits in memory. To this end, we conducted a hierarchical regression 
entering description and then memory performance in separate blocks before adding age. As 
expected, the number of internal details in the picture description condition was a significant 
predictor of imagination performance (R
2  = .783, F(1,28) = 78.343, p < .001). Adding number of 
internal details in the memory condition as a predictor slightly but significantly improved the 
model (R
2 change = .076, F(1,28) = 10.916, p < .01)   Interestingly, we found a small but 
significant imagination-specific deficit, R
2 change = .030, F(1,28) = 4.915, p = .036.    
Discussion 
  The two experiments reported here provide novel information concerning the basis of 
age-related reductions in the specificity of remembered past events and imagined future events. 
If age-related deficits in episodic detail of imagining and remembering could be attributed 
entirely to impairments specific to memory function, we would have expected the age-related 
impairment in episodic detail for the picture description task to be reduced or non-existent 
relative to impairment evident for the imagination and memory tasks. Alternatively, if 
mechanisms other than memory contribute to performance on the memory or imagination tasks, 
we would expect parallel patterns across all tasks.  While we replicated previous findings of age-
related reductions in episodic specificity for remembered and imagined events (Addis et al., 
2008, 2010; Levine et al., 2002), we also extended the pattern to picture description. Moreover, 
performance on the picture description task accounted for the bulk of variance in memory and 
imagination performance. Nonetheless, there was a significant albeit modest contribution of 
aging to memory and imagination performance above-and-beyond picture description 
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Our findings have a number of implications for the constructive episodic simulation 
hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 2007), which holds that age deficits in imagining future events 
reflect a problem in retrieving details from prior episodes and recombining them into a novel 
imaginary scenarios. The similar performance of older adults on picture description, imagination, 
and memory tasks appears to indicate that mechanisms other than episodic memory are also 
relevant to understanding previous observations of parallel age-related declines in episodic 
specificity during memory and imagination.  
For example, changes in narrative style (e.g., Coupland & Coupland, 1995; James et al., 
1998; Labouvie-Vief & Blanchard-Fields, 1982), such that older adults maintain different 
communicative goals from younger adults – emphasizing personal meaning rather than a precise 
reiteration of events – could contribute to decreased internal and increased external details in 
older adults across all three tasks.  Alternatively, age-related differences in the ability to inhibit 
task-irrelevant thought (e.g., Arbuckle & Gold, 1993; Zacks & Hasher, 1994) might result in 
fewer internal details as well as more details that are coded as external (for discussion, see 
Schacter et al., 2011). It is interesting to note in this regard that despite the possibility that the 
picture description task may be somewhat more concrete and constrained than the memory and 
imagination tasks, and therefore potentially less prone to influence from task-irrelevant thoughts, 
the identical pattern of internal and external details was observed across tasks.  In any case, 
because our results do not distinguish between the foregoing hypotheses, future research will be 
needed to characterize the non-episodic sources of age differences in tasks like those used here. 
We think that such research could benefit from adopting new approaches to characterizing 
narrative discourse in older versus younger adults, such as that recently illustrated in recent work 
by Trunk and Abrams (2009). 	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Nonetheless, both experiments revealed that not all age-related reductions in internal 
details during memory and imagination were accounted for by picture description performance. 
These findings are consistent with the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis and indicate 
that age-related changes in processes emphasized by that hypothesis, such as impaired retrieval 
and recombination of episodic detail, merit further investigation. The finding from Experiment 2 
that a small age deficit in imagination was observed even after controlling for memory 
performance raises the intriguing possibility that there are age-related changes in processes 
specific to imagination, such as recombining episodic details (Addis et al., 2010; Addis & 
Schacter, 2008; Schacter & Addis, 2009).   
  Finally, our findings have implications for studies that have used the Autobiographical 
Interview to examine memory in various patient populations. (cf., Levine et al., 2002; Levine, 
Svoboda, Turner, Mandic, & Mackey, 2009; McKinnon, Black, Miller, Moscovitch, & Levine, 
2006; Murphy, Troyer, Levine, & Moscovitch, 2008; Rosenbaum, Gilboa, Levine, Winocur, & 
Moscovitch, 2009; Rudoy, Weintraub, & Paller, 2009). Such studies have typically attempted to 
distinguish episodic and semantic contributions to autobiographical memory based on 
Autobiographical Interview performance.  However, our findings indicate that one cannot simply 
assume that Autobiographical Interview performance reflects specifically the operation of 
memory mechanisms (see also Rudoy et al. (2009) for discussion of some related issues). Future 
studies using the Autobiographical Interview will need to incorporate a condition such as the 
picture description task used here, in which narratives are collected that do not require episodic 
memory, in order to provide a broader characterization of between-group differences in 
Autobiographical Interview performance and potentially relevant higher-order cognitive 
processes.  	 ﾠ 38	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Abstract 
 
Imagining future events and remembering past events rely on a common core network, 
but several regions within this network – including the hippocampus – show increased activity 
for imagining future events compared to remembering past events. It remains unclear whether 
this hippocampal activity reflects processes related to the demands of constructing details 
retrieved across disparate episodic memories into coherent imaginary events, encoding these 
events into memory, novelty detection, or some combination of these processes. We manipulated 
the degree of constructive processing by comparing activity associated with the initial 
construction of an imagined scenario with the re-construction of an imagined scenario (imagine 
vs. re-imagine). After accounting for effects of novelty and subsequent memory, we found that 
found a region in the hippocampus was preferentially activated for newly constructed imagined 
events compared with re-imagined events. Our results suggest that the hippocampus may support 
several distinct but related processes that are critical for imagining future events, and they also 
indicate that a particular region within posterior hippocampus may uniquely contribute to the 
construction of imagined future events. 
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Imagining the future:  
Evidence for a hippocampal contribution to constructive processing. 
The capacity to imagine possible future events supports humans’ ability to plan and 
prepare for new experiences in an adaptive manner. Whether preparing for a job interview, 
hunting for a new apartment, or anticipating a first date, mentally projecting ourselves into novel 
situations and simulating the potential consequences of different actions can help guide future 
decision-making (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007; 
Schacter, 2012; Schacter et al., 2012). Considerable evidence indicates that imagining future 
events and remembering past events rely on a common core network that includes the 
hippocampus in addition to other medial temporal, parietal, and prefrontal regions (for review, 
see Schacter et al., 2012). However, the role of the hippocampus in imagining future experiences 
has recently been the subject of debate.  
Neuroimaging studies have consistently found evidence for hippocampal activation when 
people imagine future events (for review, see Addis & Schacter, 2012; Schacter et al., 2012). 
Indeed, several studies have shown that activity in the hippocampus is greater for imagining 
compared to remembering (e.g. Addis et al., 2007; Weiler et al., 2010; Addis et al., 2011). It has 
been suggested that such activity reflects more intensive constructive processing during 
imagining than remembering, that is, the hippocampus may play a role in recombining details 
gleaned from disparate episodic memories into a coherent novel scenario (Schacter & Addis, 
2007).  Evidence consistent with the idea that hippocampal activity is associated with a 
recombination process comes from studies that have observed greater hippocampal activity when 
the degree of constructive processing is increased by manipulating the probability that the event 
will occur (i.e. greater hippocampal activation for low than high probability future events; Weiler 	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et al., 2010), the amount of recombined detail (Addis & Schacter, 2008) or the specificity of an 
imagined episode (Addis et al., 2011).  
However, other findings call into question the possibility that the hippocampus plays a 
role in recombining details during the construction of imagined events.  For example, 
hippocampal activity in neuroimaging studies is not always greater for imagined than 
remembered events; comparable levels of activity have been observed in some studies and 
greater hippocampal activity for remembering than imagining in others (for review and 
discussion, see Addis & Schacter, 2012; Schacter et al., 2012). Moreover, recent neuroimaging 
evidence reveals a role for the hippocampus in the successful encoding of imagined future events 
into episodic memory (Martin et al., 2011), raising the possibility that evidence for greater 
hippocampal activation during imagining than remembering reflects encoding-related activity. 
Finally, several studies of amnesic patients with hippocampal damage show that such patients 
exhibit impaired abilities to imagine coherent scenes and future events (Hassabis, Kumaran, 
Vann, et al., 2007; Andelman et al., 2010; Race et al., 2011; Romero & Moscovitch, 2012; see 
also, Tulving, 1985; Klein et al., 2002,), but others find no such impairments (Maguire et al., 
2010; Squire et al., 2010; Hurley et al., 2011, Cooper et al., 2011).  
Addis and Schacter (2012) suggested that these discrepant findings could be reconciled if 
different regions within the hippocampus support separate component processes underlying 
imagining and remembering. This multicomponent account proposes that the hippocampus 
contributes to distinct but related processes that support imagining future events, including 
retrieving episodic details, recombining those details into coherent scenarios, and encoding the 
newly formed scenarios into episodic memory. From this perspective, hippocampal activation in 
neuroimaging studies of episodic simulation could potentially reflect the contributions of any of 	 ﾠ 42	 ﾠ
the three component processes, depending on the extent to which experimental conditions draw 
on each component. In neuropsychological studies of patient populations, partial damage to the 
hippocampus may impair specific component processes while leaving others relatively intact, 
thereby giving rise to differential patterns of impairment. Although the multicomponent view 
cannot resolve all discrepancies in the literature, it seems clear that elucidating the precise 
contribution of the hippocampus to imagination and future thinking requires teasing apart these 
intertwined component processes in a rigorous and controlled manner.  
To clarify the contributions of the hippocampus to imagining future events, we drew on 
experimental recombination (Addis, Pan, et al., 2009), subsequent memory (Wagner et al., 
1998), and task switching paradigms (Duncan et al., 2012). Participants imagined novel future 
events constructed from person, place, and object details taken from their own autobiographical 
memories. Subjects imagined some future events for the first time in the scanner, and re-
imagined other events that they previously imagined the day before. Events imagined for the first 
time should elicit a greater recombination demand than re-imagining events because they require 
the initial integration of disparate details into an event. However, events imagined for the first 
time are also more novel than re-imagined events, making it difficult to determine whether 
differential hippocampal activity for imagined compared with re-imagined events reflects 
differences in recombination demand or differences in event novelty (van Mulukom, Schacter, 
Corballis, & Addis, 2013). To control for novelty differences between imagine and re-imagine 
conditions, recombined person, place, and object detail sets were observed in a pre-exposure 
session the day before scanning in which subjects imagined future events for some of these detail 
sets, and judged the relative pleasantness of the details for others. Thus, the novelty of the event 
details was held constant across these two conditions by virtue of equivalent pre-exposure to the 	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detail sets, but the details were integrated into a coherent future event in the imagine condition 
and were not integrated into a coherent event in the pleasantness condition. In the scanner, trials 
involved either switching tasks using the same detail sets as the previous day or repeating the 
imagining task. Thus, subjects 1) imagined future events for the first time using detail sets for 
which they had previously judged pleasantness, 2) judged the pleasantness of person, place, and 
object details for the first time using some of the detail sets for which they had previously 
imagined an event, or 3) re-imagined events using the remaining detail sets that they had 
previously imagined the day before. After scanning, participants completed a cued-recall test, 
thus allowing us to hold constant encoding success for imagined and re-imagined events. If the 
involvement of the hippocampus in constructing imagined future episodes includes a 
recombination process, then we would predict greater hippocampal activity for imagined 
compared to re-imagined events after controlling for both encoding- and novelty-related 
processing.  
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-four, right-handed healthy adults (16 females; age M = 21.4, SD = 2.9) with no 
prior history of psychiatric, neurological, or other medical impairment that could compromise 
cognitive function, and possessing normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in this 
study. An additional nine participants were run but excluded from data analysis due to failure to 
produce enough successfully encoded trials (> 10 per successfully remembered condition), task 
noncompliance, or excessive movement. All participants provided written informed consent and 
were compensated for their participation according to ethical guidelines approved by the Harvard 
University Institutional Review Board.  	 ﾠ 44	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Materials and procedure 
Design. Subjects performed three main tasks of interest while in the scanner. They 
imagined future events for the first time using detail sets for which they had previously judged 
the relative pleasantness of details (Imagine condition), judged the relative pleasantness of 
details for the first time using some of the detail sets for which they had previously imagined an 
event (Pleasant condition), or re-imagined events using the remaining detail sets that they had 
previously imagined the day before (Re-imagine condition).  Critically, both the Imagine and Re-
imagine conditions consisted of detail sets that were retrieved from disparate episodic memories, 
but in the Imagine condition the details had previously been encountered during the pleasantness 
task, which did not require combining the details into a coherent episodic scenario, whereas in 
the Re-imagine condition, subjects had previously combined the details into a coherent episodic 
scenario. All conditions are matched for prior exposure to the person-location-object triplets. 
Pre-scan: Autobiographical memory collection. Approximately one week (M = 10.29, 
SD = 3.01) prior to scanning, participants came into the laboratory and recalled 200 
autobiographical memories from the past 15 years, writing a description for every memory.  
Participants were allowed access to Facebook and were provided with a sample list of common 
life events to facilitate retrieval of the required number of memories. Each memory had to be 
specific in time and place (i.e. episodic) and comprised of a unique person, location, and object 
that could not be duplicated across events.  The experimenter checked on the participant about 
once every hour to review the participant’s progress and to ensure that the reported memories 
complied with instructions. Any reported memories that failed to comply with instructions were 
not used as stimuli in subsequent sessions. Before returning for the next session, person, location, 	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and object details were recombined across memories, thereby creating 180 newly formed person-
location-object sets that were derived from three separate autobiographical memories. 
Pre-scan: Pre-exposure. The day prior to scanning, participants imagined future events 
involving 120 of these detail sets, and judged the relative pleasantness of the details for the 
remaining 60 sets. For the 120 imagined future event trials, participants silently imagined a 
specific novel event integrating the three details within a person-location-object set that could 
plausibly occur in next five years. For the 60 pleasantness trials, participants constructed a 
sentence ranking the relative pleasantness of details within a person-location-object set, 
“Wedding ring is more pleasant than JFK Park is more pleasant than Sally”, for example. 
Subjects were given 9 s to imagine an event or rank the pleasantness of details. Following these 
tasks, participants provided a unique title that briefly summarized a generated event or judgment 
(e.g. “Playing badminton with Adrian” for an imagined trial, “Wedding ring > JFK Park > Sally” 
for a pleasantness trial).  
Scanning. Immediately before entering the scanner, participants were administered 
practice trials (one trial for each condition) and the experimenter ensured that all instructions 
were understood. In the scanner, trials consisted of either switching task conditions (judging the 
relative pleasantness of person-location-object details that were used to imagine future events 
during the pre-exposure session or vice versa) or repeating the imagining task using the same 
person-location-object detail sets as in the pre-exposure session (see Figure 2.1). For 9 s, task 
instruction prompts were presented along with person-location-object detail sets and event or 
judgment titles that participants generated the previous day.  Presenting titles during scanning 
that summarize previously generated events or judgments holds constant differences that might 
reflect repeating or recalling experiences from the pre-exposure session; varying across 	 ﾠ 46	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conditions is whether or not disparate details have been recombined into a specific imagined 
episode. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. This study involved four experimental sessions. First, participants recalled 
autobiographical memories. Second, participants imagined events or made pleasantness 
judgments on detail-sets experimentally recombined across autobiographical memories. Third, 
participants re-imagined the same event from the previous session, imagined an event for the 
first time, made pleasantness for the first time, or completed a size judgment control task. 
Finally, subsequent memory performance was assessed with cued-recall test. 
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The experimental design yielded these three condition types (Imagine, Pleasant, Re-
imagine) composed of 60 trials each labeled according to the task completed during scanning.  
Participants also completed 30 trials of size judgment task (Size condition) based on a previous 
study by Addis, Pan, et al. (2009), during which they had 9 s to integrate three nouns into a 
sentence that ranked the relative size of each item in a “X is bigger than Y is bigger than Z” 
format. Phenomenological ratings of how detailed the imagined event was (for Imagine and Re-
imagine trials) or how difficult it was to make a relative judgment (for Pleasantness and Size 
trials) were collected using a button box (1 = low, 4 = high) for 3 s following imagining an event 
or making a relative judgment. These phenomenological ratings (i.e. detail and difficulty) not 
only offer information concerning subjective experiences, but also serve as an online indicator of 
task compliance in the scanner on a trial-by-trial basis, hence subsequent analyses only include 
trials during which participants provided a response. Notably, participants provided a response 
for 95% of trials, indicating a high rate of task compliance. Each trial (experimental task + 
phenomenological rating: 12 s) was randomly interleaved with 3, 6, or 9 s of fixation, allowing 
for an event-related analysis by establishing temporal jitter in the experimental design. 
Post-scanning: Subsequent memory test. Ten minutes after the last experimental trial, 
participants completed a surprise cued-recall task using a procedure similar to that used in 
previous studies for testing memory of events with several elements (Jones, 1976; Martin et al., 
2011; Szpunar, Addis, & Schacter, 2012). The test was composed of 180 trials, 60 trials each 
from the Re-imagine, Imagine, and Pleasant tasks presented during scanning. On every trial of 
the memory test, two of three details (person and place, place and object, or person and object) 
from a scanning trial were presented and the missing detail was to be recalled. Since participants 
were instructed during scanning to integrate all three details –either into a coherent event 	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(Imagine and Re-imagine), or by making a relative judgment (Pleasant) – subsequent memory 
for these details reflects how well these details were bound together.  The detail to be recalled 
was counterbalanced across detail type (person, location, or object). Participants were instructed 
that they could guess if they felt reasonably certain of the right answer. The test was self-paced, 
lasting about one hour.  
fMRI parameters and preprocessing. Brain imaging data were collected on a 3T 
Siemens Magnetom Tim Trio MRI scanner with a 12-channel phased-array whole-head coil. 
Anatomical scans were acquired using a T1-weighted high-resolution three-dimensional 
magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo sequence (MPRAGE: 176 sagittal slices, TR = 2530 
ms, TE = 1.64 ms, 7° flip angle, 1 mm isotropic voxels). 
Six task blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) functional scans were acquired using a 
T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) pulse sequence (47 interleaved axial slices parallel to 
the anterior-posterior commissure plane, TR = 3000 ms, TE = 30 ms, 85° flip angle, no skip 
between slices, 3 mm isotropic voxels). Task stimuli were presented using E-Prime software to 
display text that was projected onto a screen at the head of the scanner and reflected into a mirror 
on top of the head coil for the participant to see. Two additional 6 min 12 s resting state BOLD 
scans (not presented here) were acquired at the beginning and end of the scanning session. 
Cushions were used to minimize head movement during scanning. Participants made responses 
using a button box placed in their right hand.  
  Functional scans were preprocessed using SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive 
Neurology, London, UK). To allow for T1-saturation effects, the initial 4 volumes in each run 
were excluded from analyses. Data were corrected for slice-dependent timing differences and for 
head movement within and across runs using a rigid body correction. Data were then spatially 	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normalized to the standard space of the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) atlas (resampled 
at 2 mm cubic voxels), and spatially smoothed with a 6 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian 
kernel. All coordinates are reported in MNI space. 
After preprocessing, data were analyzed with the general linear model using SPM8. The 
BOLD responses for seven trial types (i.e. imagine hit, imagine miss, re-imagine hit, re-imagine 
miss, pleasant hit, pleasant miss, size sentence) were modeled for each participant. The onsets of 
these trials were then convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function to create 
regressors of interest. In doing so we restricted our analyses to the neural activity related to the 
construction phase of simulating events and thereby minimize contamination by other cognitive 
processes including elaboration-related activity, consistent with previous methods (Addis et al., 
2007; Martin et al. 2011).  Additional covariates of no interest (a session mean, a linear trend, 
and subject-specific movement parameters) were also modeled. First-level planned contrasts (i.e. 
fixed effects models) were performed on these parameter estimates, and contrast images for each 
participant were subsequently entered into a second-level analysis treating participants as 
random effects. For the imagine and re-imagine conditions, linear parametric modulation 
regressors of detail ratings were included to (1) ensure that differences between conditions are 
not simply attributed to the amount of details retrieved and (2) account for known detail 
modulation effects in the hippocampus (Addis & Schacter, 2008; Martin et al., 2011). 
Contrasts of interest were run in order to identify regions preferentially engaged by: (1) 
imagining future events by comparing imagined future events relative to the semantic control 
task (i.e. Re-imagine + Imagine > Size); and (2) constructing novel future events by comparing 
initial simulations  with repeated simulations (i.e. Imagine > Re-imagine). The two analyses were 
confined to successfully remembered trials, allowing us to hold constant encoding-related 	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activity (i.e. Imagine > Re-imagine, for hits only). However, as noted in the Introduction, a 
simple comparison of Imagine and Re-imagine conditions does not allow us to distinguish 
constructive activity or recombination demand on the one hand, and event novelty on the other. 
To remove activity related to task novelty, we performed an additional analysis in which we 
subtracted activity from the Pleasant condition (i.e. [Imagine > Pleasant] > [Re-imagine > 
Pleasant]). As noted earlier, this condition controls for novelty because, just like in the Re-
imagine condition, it elicits activity related to the retrieval of disparate details across episodic 
memories, but unlike in the Re-imagine condition, the relative pleasantness of these details must 
be judged for the first time. Thus, we computed the following contrast to control for activity 
related to both encoding and novelty (i.e. [Imagine > Pleasant] > [Re-imagine > Pleasant], for 
hits only).   
The minimum cluster size required for corrected significance was calculated using the 
3dClustSim (an adaptation of AlphaSim) AFNI program, which estimates the overall probability 
of false positives within a search volume through a Monte Carlo simulation (10,000 iterations). 
For whole-brain contrasts, we report all activations at a voxel-level threshold of p = .001 
combined with a spatial extent threshold of 89 voxels, yielding a threshold of p < .05 corrected 
for multiple comparisons. Since the hippocampus was an a priori region of interest, we 
calculated a corrected threshold using a bilateral hippocampal volume (1,878 2mm
3 voxels), 
setting a p < .05 threshold with a p = .005 voxel-level threshold and extent threshold of 17 voxels 
(Yassa & Stark, 2008).  
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Results 
Behavioral Results 
Behavioral data confirmed participant compliance during scanning as well as in the post-
scan session. Comparisons were performed using a paired-samples t-test or repeated measures 
ANOVA (Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, alpha < .05), where appropriate. On a 
4-point Likert scale (1 = low detail, 4 = high detail), re-imagined future events were rated 
significantly more detailed (M = 2.87, SE = 0.10) than imagined future events (M = 2.73, SE = 
.10), t(23) = 2.58, p = .017 (see Table 2.1). In addition to ratings serving as an indicator of 
subject compliance on a trial-by-trial basis during scanning, this pattern of detail ratings suggests 
that during the pre-exposure session, participants were able to comply with task instructions to 
either discretely imagine an event, or to judge the pleasantness of details without constructing an 
imagined event during the Pre-exposure phase: if subjects had imagined events during the 
pleasantness task, one would expect detail ratings to be similar across Imagine and Re-imagine 
conditions, but this was not the case. Subsequently-remembered imagined and re-imagined 
events (hits) were significantly more detailed (M = 3.01, SE = .08) than subsequently forgotten 
imagined and re-imagined events (misses; M = 2.59, SE = .10), t(23) = 7.88, p < .001. Although 
detail ratings significantly differed across Imagine and Re-imagine conditions and predicted 
subsequent memory performance, since detail ratings were included in SPM as parametric 
modulator, any changes in BOLD signal associated with detail would be accounted for in our 
model. 
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 ﾠ2.1	 ﾠ	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Behavioral	 ﾠresults	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ(and	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 ﾠ 	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 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ2.51	 ﾠ(.01)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ2.66	 ﾠ(.09)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Hit	 ﾠand	 ﾠMiss	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ2.73	 ﾠ(.01)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ2.87	 ﾠ(.01)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ_____________________________	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠMean	 ﾠ#	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrials	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠSE)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ_____________________________	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Hit	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ27.45	 ﾠ(2.37)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ44.71	 ﾠ(1.51)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ22.45	 ﾠ(1.62)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Miss	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ28.83	 ﾠ(2.23)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ12.17	 ﾠ(1.35)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ35.17	 ﾠ(1.79)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Hit	 ﾠand	 ﾠMiss	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ56.29	 ﾠ(1.08)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ56.89	 ﾠ(0.81)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ57.63	 ﾠ(1.13)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
_________________________________________________________________________________________________	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
 
To evaluate subsequent memory differences across experimental tasks, we compared 
difference scores (subtracting the number of misses from the number of hits) for each 
experimental task. The difference scores were as follows: Re-imagine (M = 32.54, SE = 2.74), 
Imagine (M = -1.38, SE = 4.48), Pleasantness (M = -12.70, SE = 3.21). The number of hits 
compared to misses systematically varied across conditions (F(2,46) = 95.20, p < .001). Re-
imagine trials were more likely to be subsequently remembered than Imagine and Pleasant trials. 
Further, Imagine trials were more likely to be remembered than Pleasant trials. Although one 
must be cautious interpreting subsequent memory effects (i.e. hits compared to misses) from 
different bin sizes across conditions to avoid confounding effects of experimental task with 	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subsequent memory, these observed differences should not systematically bias interpreting 
differences in BOLD signal across conditions restricted to subsequently remembered items only. 
fMRI Results  
Imagining future events. Imagination conditions, relative to the semantic control task 
(i.e. Imagine + Re-imagine > Size), revealed activation in medial prefrontal cortex, posterior 
cingulate cortex, retrosplenial cortex, middle frontal gyrus, lateral and medial temporal lobes, 
consistent with many previous studies (for review, Schacter et al., 2012) (see Table 2.2 Figure 
2.2A).  
	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ2.2	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
FMRI	 ﾠresults:	 ﾠwhole-ﾭ‐brain	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Brain	 ﾠRegion	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ peak	 ﾠMNI	 ﾠcoordinate	 ﾠ(x,	 ﾠy,	 ﾠz)	 ﾠ Z-ﾭ‐score	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Re-ﾭ‐imagine	 ﾠ+	 ﾠImagine	 ﾠ>	 ﾠSize	 ﾠControl	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠPosterior	 ﾠCingulate	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 2,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐56,	 ﾠ22	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 7.32	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
L	 ﾠVentral	 ﾠMPFC	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐8,	 ﾠ36,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐14	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 6.66	 ﾠ
L	 ﾠMiddle	 ﾠTemporal	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐58,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐6,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐18	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 6.57	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠMiddle	 ﾠTemporal	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 52,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐6,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐26	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 5.67	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠPrecuneus	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 6,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐56,	 ﾠ50	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 5.44	 ﾠ
L	 ﾠSuperior	 ﾠFrontal	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐20,	 ﾠ30,	 ﾠ46	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 5.33	 ﾠ
L	 ﾠSuperior	 ﾠFrontal	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐12,	 ﾠ54,	 ﾠ46	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 5.02	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠTemporal	 ﾠPole	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 40,	 ﾠ20,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐38	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.82	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠMiddle	 ﾠFrontal	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 42,	 ﾠ14,	 ﾠ30	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.75	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠCerebellum	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 14,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐72,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐30	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.23	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠCerebellum	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 14,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐88,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐40	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.16	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠOrbital	 ﾠFrontal	 ﾠcortex	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 30,	 ﾠ26,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐24	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 3.99	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠSuperior	 ﾠfrontal	 ﾠgyrus	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 24,	 ﾠ26,	 ﾠ44	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 3.68	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Imagine	 ﾠ>	 ﾠRe-ﾭ‐imagine	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
L	 ﾠLateral	 ﾠoccipital	 ﾠgyrus	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐26,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐88,	 ﾠ18	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 5.50	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠAnterior	 ﾠPrecuneus	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐6,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐54,	 ﾠ50	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.89	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠFusiform	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ 24,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐84,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐6	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.72	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠFusiform	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ 30,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐84,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐6	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.72	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠSuperior	 ﾠFrontal	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ 32,	 ﾠ20,	 ﾠ62	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.52	 ﾠ
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Table	 ﾠ2.2	 ﾠ(Continued)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
L	 ﾠSuperior	 ﾠFrontal	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐26,	 ﾠ40,	 ﾠ42	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.42	 ﾠ
L	 ﾠInferior	 ﾠTemporal	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐38,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐58,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐4	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.33	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(Imagine	 ﾠ>	 ﾠPleasant)	 ﾠ>	 ﾠ(Re-ﾭ‐imagine	 ﾠ>	 ﾠPleasant)	 ﾠhits	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠSuperior	 ﾠFrontal	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 24,	 ﾠ22,	 ﾠ56	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.77	 ﾠ
L	 ﾠLateral	 ﾠOccipital	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐24,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐88,	 ﾠ20	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.67	 ﾠ
R	 ﾠSuperior	 ﾠParietal	 ﾠLobule	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 20,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐70,	 ﾠ56	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.64	 ﾠ
L	 ﾠFusiform	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐26,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐84,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐4	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.38	 ﾠ
Calcarine	 ﾠCortex	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 0,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐90,	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.36	 ﾠ
L	 ﾠSuperior	 ﾠParietal	 ﾠLobule	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐20,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐62,	 ﾠ52	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 3.97	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Re-ﾭ‐imagine	 ﾠ>	 ﾠImagine,	 ﾠhits	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
L	 ﾠInferior	 ﾠFrontal	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐42,	 ﾠ28,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐8	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.74	 ﾠ
L	 ﾠMiddle	 ﾠTemporal	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐48,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐28,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐10	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.27	 ﾠ
L	 ﾠAngular	 ﾠGyrus	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐40,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐60,	 ﾠ44	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.20	 ﾠ
L	 ﾠPosterior	 ﾠPrecuneus	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐8,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐70,	 ﾠ34	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4.05	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Note. All activations are significant at a p < .05 threshold corrected for multiple comparisons 
with a p = .001 voxel-level threshold and extent threshold of 89 voxels. MNI, Montreal 
Neurological Institute; L, left; R, right. 
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Figure 2.2. Whole-brain activations are significant at a P < 0.05 threshold corrected for multiple      
comparisons with a P = 0.001 voxel-level threshold and minimum extent threshold of 89 voxels. 
L, left; R, right. 
 
Encoding and novelty in the hippocampus. To examine novelty processing, we 
contrasted conditions that involved switching tasks across sessions to the condition that repeats 
the same task (Pleasant 1 Imagine > Re-Imagine). This contrast showed significant activity in 
regions (222, 226, 28; 22, 228, 26) near the midline of the long axis of hippocampus extending 
anteriorly, similar to previous observations (e.g. Kumaran & Maguire, 2007). To examine 
encoding effects, we contrasted hits versus misses collapsed across Imagine and Re-imagine 	 ﾠ 56	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conditions. Consistent with Martin et al. (2011), we observed evidence that the anterior 
hippocampus supports encoding activity. Our analysis revealed a single cluster (228, 26, 228) 
activated at a voxelwise threshold of P 5 0.012 which when combined with a spatial extent of 21 
voxels in 3dClustSim approached a corrected threshold of P 5 0.10. While this hippocampal 
activity is only suggestive, most likely because we had far fewer trials than did Martin et al. 
(2011) due to design constraints of our study, the activity observed here generally aligns well 
with the findings of Martin et al. (2011).  
Constructing future events: hippocampal analysis. Contrasting activation engaged by 
imagining an event for the first time compared to re-imagining the same event (Imagine > Re-
imagine) elicited greater activity in the right anterior and bilateral posterior hippocampus. This 
contrast revealed candidate regions that could support a constructive process, since imagining an 
event for the first time requires the initial construction of disparate details into an event rather 
than the less intensive processing of re-construction. However, as pointed out earlier, this 
contrast does not allow us to separate processes associated with construction of imagined events 
from those associated with novelty detection or encoding. To control for these confounds, we ran 
a tighter contrast that removed activity associated with novelty of event details (Pleasant 
condition) and held encoding constant by constraining our analysis to hits only (i.e. [Imagine > 
Pleasant] > [Re-imagine > Pleasant], for hits only). This more rigorous contrast revealed that 
only the left posterior hippocampus remained preferentially engaged (see Figure 2.3, Table 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3. As the hippocampus was an a priori region of interest, activations are presented at a P 
< 0.05 threshold corrected for multiple comparisons with a P=0.005 voxel-level threshold  and 
extent threshold of 17 voxels with the whole brain masked to only show voxels within the 
bilateral hippocampus. L, left; R, right.  
 
Table	 ﾠ2.3	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
FMRI	 ﾠresults:	 ﾠhippocampal	 ﾠmasked	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Brain	 ﾠRegion	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ peak	 ﾠMNI	 ﾠcoordinate	 ﾠ(x,	 ﾠy,	 ﾠz)	 ﾠ Z-ﾭ‐score	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Imagine	 ﾠ>	 ﾠRe-ﾭ‐imagine	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Anterior	 ﾠRight	 ﾠHippocampus	 ﾠ 36,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐18,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐14	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 3.25	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Posterior	 ﾠRight	 ﾠHippocampus	 ﾠ 24,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐28,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐10	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 3.69	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Posterior	 ﾠLeft	 ﾠHippocampus	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐36,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐34,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐6	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 3.69	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(Imagine	 ﾠ>	 ﾠPleasant)	 ﾠ>	 ﾠ(Re-ﾭ‐imagine	 ﾠ>	 ﾠPleasant)	 ﾠhits	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Posterior	 ﾠLeft	 ﾠHippocampus	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐36,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐36,	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐6	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 3.22	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Note. Activations are significant at a p < .05 threshold corrected for multiple comparisons with a 
p = .005 voxel-level threshold and extent threshold of 17 voxels. MNI, Montreal Neurological 
Institute; L, left; R, right. 	 ﾠ 58	 ﾠ
Constructing future events: whole brain analysis.	 ﾠContrasting activation during 
imagining an event for the first time compared to re-imagining the same event (Imagine > Re-
imagine) revealed increased activity in the superior frontal gyri and regions in occipital and 
temporal cortex related to visual/imagery processing (see Table 2.2, Figure 2.2B). We then 
controlled for novelty- and encoding-related activity by subtracting activity associated with the 
Pleasant condition and held subsequent memory performance constant (i.e. [Imagine > Pleasant] 
> [Re-imagine > Pleasant], for hits only) This contrast showed activity in bilateral parietal lobes 
as well as activity in regions related to visual/imagery processing, but now most prominently 
observed was activity in the right superior frontal gyrus (see Table 2.2, Figure 2.2C). We also 
examined increases in activity for repeated simulations (Re-imagine > Imagine). This contrast 
revealed greater activity for re-imagining compared to imagining in the superior precuneus, 
inferior frontal gyrus, and lateral temporal cortex (see Table 2.2).	 ﾠ
Discussion 
A distributed network of brain regions that includes the hippocampus is commonly 
activated for remembering the past and imagining the future (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis 
& Maguire, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007; Spreng et al., 2009; Schacter et al., 2012). Moreover, the 
hippocampus has also shown increased activity for imagining compared to remembering (e.g. 
Addis et al., 2007; Weiler et al., 2010; Addis et al., 2011). It has been proposed that this 
preferential hippocampal activity reflects the increased recombination demand associated with 
integrating disparate episodic details into coherent scenarios (Schacter & Addis, 2007). The aim 
of the present study was to evaluate this hypothesis by examining whether hippocampal activity 
is sensitive to differences in constructive demand after controlling for both encoding- and 
novelty-related activity. Our findings suggest that the hippocampal contributions to imagining 	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future events extend beyond encoding and novelty processing because even with these processes 
controlled for, left posterior hippocampus was involved in the constructive process of 
recombining disparate details from memory into a coherent scenario when simulating a future 
event.  
Although previous studies have observed increased hippocampal activity under 
conditions that have been interpreted as reflecting a more intensive or demanding constructive 
processing (Addis et al., 2007, 2011; Addis & Schacter, 2008; Weiler et al., 2010), the 
confounding influences of encoding- and novelty-related processes have made this claim 
difficult to evaluate. Our results thus provide some support to previous interpretations of 
increased hippocampal activation during imagining compared with remembering as reflecting 
differences in recombination processing (e.g. Addis et al, 2007). Although a few studies have 
found that remembering past events evokes greater activity than imagining future events 
(Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008; D’Argembeau, 
Xue, Lu, Van der Linden, & Bechara, 2008), the paradigms used in these studies required 
subjects to pre-imagine events before being scanned, thereby reducing constructive demand 
during the scanning session. Thus, rather than offering contradictory findings, these studies 
suggest that the online construction of imagined events is an important feature to consider when 
interpreting existing results and designing future studies.  
  While the evidence for a constructive, recombinatory process in the hippocampus under 
the stringent conditions of the present experiment provides support for the idea that the 
hippocampus plays a role in generating imagined events, the anterior-posterior localization of 
this activity conflicts with previous reports that the anterior hippocampus in particular underlies 
recombination (Addis et al., 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2009; Weiler et al., 2010). One possible 	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explanation is that the anterior hippocampal activity in these studies reflects the encoding of 
novel episodes as opposed to their construction. Consistent with the anterior hippocampus 
reflecting the encoding of novel imagined events, Martin et al. (2011) showed that this region 
was more active for successfully remembered compared to successfully forgotten imagined 
future events constructed online in the scanner.  They also observed a cluster in the posterior 
hippocampus that was greater for successfully remembered versus forgotten imagined events. 
However, in the absence of a manipulation that distinguishes encoding processes from 
recombination processes, it is difficult to tease apart a constructive process that requires the 
binding of details into a coherent event from processes that support the successful encoding of 
those details into an enduring memory trace.   
Further evidence suggesting that the anterior hippocampus encodes novel episodes comes 
from a number of studies that demonstrate an encoding-retrieval distribution along the anterior-
posterior axis of the hippocampus with the anterior supporting encoding and the posterior 
supporting retrieval (Lepage, Habib, & Tulving, 1998; Schacter & Wagner, 1999; Spaniol et al., 
2009). Moreover, the anterior hippocampus appears particularly engaged when encoding 
associative information (Kirwan & Stark, 2004; Chua, Schacter, Rand-Giovannetti, & Sperling, 
2007). However, we must be cautious about making strong claims exclusively linking the 
posterior hippocampus with recombination processes. For example, a recent meta-analysis of 
neuroimaging studies investigating medial temporal lobe activity during remembering and 
imagining tasks revealed that a number of parameters (i.e. type of cue, task, event specificity) 
can impact the precise location of activity in the hippocampus and related regions (Viard, 
Desgranges, Eustache, & Piolino, 2012). Future studies capable of distinguishing constructive 	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processing from encoding using a variety of such manipulations are needed before making strong 
claims. 
Given the involvement of the posterior hippocampus in spatial processing (Maguire et al., 
2000; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007), it may be that this region supports the formation 
of a coherent spatiotemporal representation from disparate episodic details. Indeed, to the extent 
that simulations of future events meaningfully inform planning and preparation, this process 
seems critical. If the idea has merit, amnesic patients with posterior hippocampal damage should 
exhibit problems forming a coherent spatiotemporal imagined event, but as noted earlier the 
nature and even existence of imagination deficits in hippocampal amnesics is currently the topic 
of intensive debate (cf., Maguire & Hassabis, 2011; Squire et al., 2010; for review, see Addis & 
Schacter, 2012). Although most reported cases of hippocampal amnesic patients exhibiting an 
intact ability to construct imagined events have not included measures of event integration or 
spatial coherence (e.g. Squire et al., 2010), Maguire and Hassabis (2011) claim that the patients 
studied by Squire et al. (2010) appear to exhibit a reduction in spatial details relative to typical 
numbers generated by controls.  
 Evidence potentially relevant to our findings comes from Hassabis et al. (2007), who 
found that four of five amnesic subjects showed imagination deficits on their scene construction 
task. Nonetheless, they did observe one amnesic patient with a spared ability to vividly imagine 
events, PO1.  PO1 suffered from dense amnesia, with 50% bilateral hippocampal volume loss, 
and a preserved ability to construct imagined scenarios –including unimpaired performance on 
measures of spatial coherence. This patient displayed signs of intact hippocampal tissue, raising 
the possibility that preserved ability to construct novel scenarios is dependent on residual 
hippocampal tissue. Using fMRI to scan PO1, Mullally, Hassabis, and Maguire (2012) observed 	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two regions in the patient’s medial temporal lobe that were more active for imagining coherent 
scenarios compared to imagining acontextual objects, the hippocampus (36, -28, -14) and the 
parahippocampus (33, -46, -5). Interestingly, the region we found to be associated with 
recombination in the present study is between these coordinates along the longitudinal axis. Of 
course, making inferences regarding the axis of the hippocampus across intact and severely 
atrophied hippocampi must be done with great caution, because the possibility of a potential 
functional reorganization induced by the lesion remains unknown.   
The pattern of posterior hippocampus activity we observed in the present study also 
aligns nicely with ideas presented in a recent review of long-axis functional specialization in the 
hippocampus. In their review, Poppenk, Evensmoen, Moscovitch, and Nadel (2013) proposed 
that differences in network connectivity and subfield composition better position the posterior 
hippocampus to represent fine-grained information compared with the anterior hippocampus, 
which preferentially represents more global features. From this perspective, imagining an event 
for the first time may require the initial construction of precise spatial and temporal details, 
whereas re-imagining the same event does not elicit the same degree of fine-grained 
construction. Further research is needed to directly test how these local and global functional 
specializations contribute to representations of imagined future events.  
One limitation of our study is that while we infer a difference in the degree of 
constructive processing between imagining an event for the first time and re-imagining the same 
event, we did not collect independent measures of constructive processing across these tasks. 
One way for future research to overcome this limitation would be to collect difficulty ratings for 
all conditions (we collected difficult ratings only for the Pleasant and Size conditions): more 	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demanding constructive processing should elicit greater difficulty ratings compared with less 
intensive constructive processing.  
Differences observed between imagining and re-imagining could also be attributed to 
differences resulting from some form of priming (i.e., the imagine condition could be conceived 
as an unprimed condition whereas the re-imagine condition could be conceived as a primed 
condition). However, recent studies examining future event simulation using a repetition 
suppression paradigm (van Mulukom et al., 2013; Szpunar et al., in press), which measures 
effects similar to priming, did not report changes in posterior hippocampal activity, and therefore 
priming effects are unlikely to explain the difference between imagining and re-imagining 
observed here. However, these differences might be related to differences in encoding and/or 
retrieval. While we attempted to control encoding-related activity by matching subsequent 
memory performance of imagined details (i.e. person, place, or object sets), this procedure 
equates for encoding success; it is possible that imagining requires greater encoding effort than 
does re-imagining; conversely, re-imagining may require greater retrieval processing of the pre-
exposure session than imagining does.  
It is also worth noting that while the experimental design we used here controlled for the 
novelty of retrieving disparate episodic details (a requirement of both Imagine and Re-imagine), 
and task novelty (by contrasting Imagine and Re-imagine with the Pleasant condition), it does 
not rule out the possibility that our data reflect the influence of novelty-related processing  
ttributable to imagining new events. Events constructed for the first time (Imagine) are novel 
compared to events constructed for the second time (Re-imagine). Thus, activity in the 
hippocampus that we interpret as reflecting constructive processing could also be attributable to 
event novelty. However, event novelty is an inherent property of event construction, so the two 	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may be difficult to separate. Future research is needed to determine whether and to what extent it 
is possible to tease apart the close relationship between event novelty and construction of 
imagined future events.  
Our results provide evidence that the hippocampus contributes to a constructive or 
recombinatory process that supports the ability to imagine future events. In light of other 
evidence that the hippocampus contributes to both encoding and novelty detection processes, our 
findings are generally consistent with the multiple component view advanced by Addis and 
Schacter (2012), which holds that the hippocampus contributes to several distinct processes that 
support imagining future events, including recombining event details into coherent scenarios. 
Critical to the theoretical success of future studies will be mapping different subregions of the 
hippocampus to specific component processes using refined methods that allow for the closely 
related processes of retrieval, construction, and encoding to be differentiated. Employing high-
resolution imaging may prove particularly useful to future progress as this method can reveal 
anatomy at the resolution of individual hippocampal subfields (Kerchner et al., 2010). As the 
hippocampus does not work in isolation, future studies should also develop approaches and 
theoretical models that directly evaluate how these component processes interact with the other 
processes embedded in the wider network supporting imagination.  
Beyond the hippocampus, imagining and re-imagining events robustly recruited the 
distributed network associated with memory, future-thinking and related functions compared to 
our semantic control task (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter, et al., 2007; Spreng et al., 2009). 
The results from the current study draw particular attention to the role of the superior frontal 
gyrus (BA8) and the posterior precuneus. In regard to the activation of superior frontal gyrus for 
imagined relative to re-imagined events, there is converging evidence that right lateralized 	 ﾠ 65	 ﾠ
activity in the superior and middle frontal gyrus is associated with inhibitory processes mediating 
controlled retrieval and encoding processes, such as suppressing the retrieval of unwanted 
learned associations (Anderson et al., 2004; Depue, Curran, & Banich, 2007; Wylie, Fox, & 
Taylor, 2008; Rizio & Dennis, 2013). This observation raises the intriguing – though speculative 
– possibility that the superior frontal gyrus may contribute to processes that actively isolate 
episodic details from their previous associations within autobiographical memories, perhaps 
transitively inhibiting the former associations from memory in order for details to be effectively 
recombined into a novel representation. In regard to the posterior precuneus, activity in this 
region increased with repeated imagining of an event rather than with event novelty; this pattern 
seems particularly robust because it has been observed across different paradigms that require 
repeated imagining of future events (van Mulukom et al., in press; Szpunar et al., in press). 
Exploring the precise role of regions beyond the hippocampus, including the superior frontal 
gyrus and the posterior precuneus, in imagining future constitutes an important task for future 
work.  
  It is only during the past few years that our understanding of the functional importance of 
the hippocampus has extended beyond the purview of remembering past experiences to include 
such functions as imagining future experiences or novel scenes (for reviews, see Buckner, 2010; 
Schacter & Addis, 2009; Schacter et al., 2012, Szpunar, 2010). As our investigation and 
understanding of imagining future events grows, the neural and cognitive processes shared by 
memory and imagination are beginning to come into view. But it also seems clear that processes 
that are preferentially recruited for imagining the future can potentially offer new theoretical 
insights into the functions of remembering the past, because a major adaptive function of 
episodic memory lies in its contribution to our ability to imagine novel events. In this way, we 	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are not strictly bound by past experiences, but instead can flexibly use past experiences to 
construct event simulations and plan for the future. 
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Abstract 
 
Empathy plays an important role in human social interaction. A multifaceted construct, 
empathy includes a prosocial motivation or intention to help others in need. While humans are 
often willing to help others in need, at times (e.g., during intergroup conflict) empathic responses 
are diminished or absent. Research examining the cognitive mechanisms underlying prosocial 
tendencies has focused on the facilitating roles of perspective taking and emotion sharing, but 
has not previously elucidated the contributions of episodic simulation and memory to facilitating 
prosocial intentions. Here we investigated whether humans’ ability to construct episodes by 
vividly imagining (episodic simulation) or remembering (episodic memory) specific events also 
supports a willingness to help others. Three experiments provide evidence for an episodic 
empathy effect: when participants were presented with a situation depicting another person’s 
plight, the act of imagining an event of helping the person or remembering a related past event of 
helping others increased prosocial intentions to help the present person in need compared to 
various control conditions. We also observed evidence suggesting that the episodic vividness of 
constructed events—rather than simply heightened emotional reactions or degree of perspective 
taking—supports this effect. Our results shed light on a role that episodic simulation and 
memory can play in fostering empathy, and begin to offer insight into the underlying 
mechanisms. 
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Episodic Empathy: When imagining and remembering increase willingness to help others 
Prosociality is widespread in nature (de Waal, 2008). Slime molds band together to 
overcome starvation
 (Gilbert, Foster, Mehdiabadi, Strassmann, & Queller, 2007), rats assist 
forcefully restrained cagemates
 (Bartal, Decety, & Mason, 2011), chimpanzees console 
distressed partners
 (Fraser, Stahl, & Aureli, 2008). Nonetheless, humans’ prosocial tendencies to 
collaborate with and help one another far exceed that of other species (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2003; Milinski, Semman, & Krambeck, 2002; Nowak & Highfield, 2011). People band with, 
assist, and console family and friends, but more strikingly, are willing to help strangers who 
suffer from plights they have not directly experienced themselves. Why are humans so willing to 
help others? 
One approach to answering this question entails investigating evolutionary mechanisms 
that select behaviors to increase reproductive success (Hamilton, 1964; Nowak & Sigmund, 
2005). Another approach is to delineate the cognitive mechanisms that underlie and promote 
willingness to help others (empathy; Batson, 2011; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). The latter strategy 
has primarily focused on how the ability to adopt the thoughts and feelings of others (perspective 
taking; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007; Tankersley, Stowe, & Huettel, 2007; Waytz et al., 2012) 
and the subsequently provoked emotional concern for others’ welfare (sympathy) support 
prosocial tendencies (Decety, 2011; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987).
 Here we ask whether humans’ 
prosocial tendencies arise not only because they can consider others’ thoughts and feelings, but 
also because they can mentally construct the act of helping. Are humans more inclined to lend a 
helping hand because they can mentally extend it? Might episodic simulation and memory—the 
abilities to vividly imagine and remember experiences located in a specific time and place
 
(Schacter et al., 2012; Tulving, 2002)—contribute to a willingness to help others?  	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Although little is known about the prosocial functions of episodic simulation and memory 
(D’Argembeau, Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2011; Gaesser, 2013; Schacter, 2012), previous 
research has shown that elaborate and vividly imagined events increase willingness to interact 
with unfamiliar others
 (Husnu & Crisp, 2010; Crisp et al., 2010), and that imagining hypothetical 
experiences and remembering actual experiences depend on many of the same cognitive and 
neural processes
 (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Schacter et al., 2012; Szpunar, 2010). 
If constructing episodic events facilitates prosocial intentions, then both imagining and 
remembering helping a person in need should heighten participants’ willingness to help. We 
aimed to evaluate this prediction by examining the extent to which imagining and remembering 
helping a person in need increased willingness to help compared with merely being exposed to 
another person’s plight and thinking of ways the person could be helped without generating an 
imagined or remembered episode. 
To do so, we recruited adults (n = 75) to participate in three experiments that examined 
reactions to stories adapted from various online media (e.g., Twitter, Tumblr, New York Times) 
(Coke et al., 1978; Rameson et al., 2011). Participants came into the lab and read a series of brief 
stories depicting people in need (e.g., locked out of a house, dealing with storm damage, 
recovering from illness). After reading a story of need, participants completed one of several 
different tasks. In Experiment 1 (n = 15), participants were asked to either (i) complete neutral 
math problems (No Helping: Math condition), or (ii) imagine a vivid scenario of helping the 
person in need (Imagine Helping condition) and then later rated their willingness to help the 
person in need. Comparing these conditions allowed us to assess whether imagining an episodic 
helping event facilitates prosocial intentions beyond a baseline reaction to learning about another 
person’s plight.  	 ﾠ 71	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In Experiment 2, we sought to (i) replicate the basic effect in a larger sample; (ii) gain 
insight into the underlying cognitive mechanisms by including additional dependent measures, 
and (iii) rule out alternative hypotheses by using more stringent control conditions. To 
accomplish these objectives, we doubled our sample size (n = 30), removed the math task and 
added two new experimental tasks in which participants were asked to either (i) focus on the 
story by considering its journalistic style and online media source (No Helping: Story condition) 
or (ii) estimate how the person could be helped by visualizing a website that the story came from 
and comments posted on it describing how the person in need could be helped (Estimate Helping 
condition). These conditions were designed to recruit semantic retrieval, social cognition, and 
generation of helping examples. By contrast, the imagine condition alone required simulating a 
temporally and contextually specific episode. After reading and reacting to all scenarios, 
participants were re-presented with the scenarios and rated, on a trial-by-trial basis, their 
willingness to help the person in need, their emotional experiences, and the sensory detail and 
coherence of their mental images (for estimate and imagine conditions only; see Methods and 
Materials and Supplemental Information for a full list of measures).  
In Experiment 3, we recruited a new sample of 30 participants. We repeated the 
procedures of Experiment 2 with the exception of replacing the Estimate Helping condition with 
remembering a related past event of helping someone in need. In addition to the same dependent 
measures as in Experiment 2, participants also indicated the similarity of past events with the 
currently presented scenarios of need. This measure was included because having personally 
experienced similar episodes in one’s past has been shown to increase empathy for others, and 
therefore the degree of relatedness may modulate prosocial intentions in the current study 	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(Bluck, Baron, Ainsworth, Gesselman, & Gold, 2013; Hodges, Kiel, Kramer, Veach, & 
Villanueva, 2009; further details in Materials and Methods and Supporting Information). 
Results 
Across three experiments reported here, participants were more inclined to help a person 
in need after constructing a vivid personal episode of helping that person. We refer to this 
facilitating effect of episodic simulation and memory on prosocial intentions to help as the 
episodic empathy effect. 
Experiment 1 
As an initial test of this effect, we examined whether imagining a scenario of helping a 
person in need would increase the willingness to help that person (Imagine Helping condition) 
compared with a baseline reaction to merely being exposed to a person’s plight (No Helping: 
Math condition). This contrast revealed a significant increase in the willingness to help a person 
in need after imagining helping that person relative to only being exposed to the person’s plight 
(t(14) = 5.13, p < .001; see Figure 3.1). This finding suggests that episodic simulation can 
facilitate prosocial intentions to help others. However, because it is possible that the Imagine 
Helping condition merely elicited more attention to the story of need, we sought to examine the 
episodic empathy effect under conditions that more tightly controlled for attention to the story of 
need. Moreover, we sought to evaluate a competing hypothesis that the episodic empathy effect 
is attributable to conceptually priming participants to think in general about how a person in need 
could be helped
 (Macrae & Johnston, 1998; Nelson & Norton, 2005) rather than imagining a 
specific episodic experience per se. 
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Figure 3.1. Episodic simulation increases willingness to help. Participants were more willing to 
help (1, not at all willing; 7, very willing) when they imagined an event of helping a person in 
need (Imagine Helping; mean = 5.15, SD = .97) compared with when they were exposed to a 
person’s plight but were prevented from imagining a helping scenario by instead completing 
neutral math problems (No Helping: Math; mean = 4.24, SD = .89) in Experiment 1. This finding 
suggests that episodic simulation can facilitate empathy. Error bars, mean ± standard error. 
 
 
Experiment 2 
The results from Experiment 2 further supported an episodic empathy effect (see Figure 
3.2a). Participants indicated that they were more willing to help a person in need when they 
imagined helping the person than when they were exposed to the plight of others by considering 
the journalistic style and source of the stories of need (No Helping: Story condition; t(29) = 6.68, 
p < .001), and when they estimated ways a person could be helped by visualizing a website that 
the story came from and the comments posted on it describing how the person in need could be 
helped (Estimate Helping condition; t(20) = 5.03, p < .001). Thus, imagining a helping episode 
promoted intentions to help others to a greater extent than focusing on the story of need or 
conceptually thinking of ways a person can be helped. Next we consider a potential cognitive 
mechanism that supports this facilitating effect of episodic simulation on empathy. 	 ﾠ 74	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Figure 3.2. Episodic processes (simulation and memory) increase willingness to help. a, 
Imagining a helping event (Imagine Helping; mean = 5.26, SD = .81) increased willingness to 
help (1, not at all willing; 7, very willing) more than focusing on the story of need (No Helping: 
Story; mean = 4.23, SD = 1.0) and estimating how the person could be helped (Estimate Helping; 
mean = 4.41, SD = .92) in Experiment 2. b, Both imagining a helping event (Imagine Helping; 
mean = 5.05, SD = .82)  and remembering a related helping event (Remember Helping; mean = 
4.88, SD = .86)  increased willingness to help more than focusing on the story of need (story; 
mean = 4.19, SD = .70) in Experiment 3. These findings replicate the episodic empathy effect 
initially observed in Experiment 1 and extend this effect to remembering related helping events, 
supporting the hypothesis that episodic process (simulation and memory) can facilitate empathy. 
Error bars, mean ± standard error. 
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Perhaps imagining an event increased the episodic vividness of that event relative to the 
control conditions, which in turn increased the subjective plausibility of the simulated event
 
(Szpunar & Schacter, 2013). As the vividness of an imagined event increases, the event can be 
brought to mind more easily, and thereby be used as diagnostic knowledge to inform decisions 
about the plausibility of the simulated event
 (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Consistent with this 
possibility, previous studies have shown that more elaborately imagined events reduce anxiety, 
improve intergroup attitudes, and increase intentions to interact with unfamiliar others
 (Husnu & 
Crisp, 2010; Crisp et al., 2010). To evaluate the impact of episodic vividness on facilitating 
prosocial intentions in Experiment 2, we calculated how changes in sensory detail and coherence 
predicted changes in willingness to help. These analyses revealed that sensory detail and 
coherence predicted willingness to help when imagining helping a person in need (r(28) = .43, p 
= .018; r(28) = .47, p = .010), but did not predict willingness to help in the estimate condition 
when thinking of ways the person could be helped (r(28) = .28, p = .133; r(28) = .27, p = .148), 
(see Figure 3.3a, 3.3b). Although the direction of the correlation is the same in the imagine and 
estimate conditions, the overall pattern of correlations suggests that it may not be the vividness 
of imagery alone that underlies the episodic empathy effect, but more specifically, the vividness 
of imagery for the simulated personal event of helping. 
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Figure 3.3. Episodic vividness predicts willingness to help. Scatter plots displaying the 
correlations between willingness to help and sensory vividness for a, Estimate Helping and b, 
Imagine Helping conditions in Experiment 2 and c, Remember Helping and d, Imagine Helping 
conditions in Experiment 3. Sensory detail and coherence predicted willingness to help when 
participants imagined or remembered a helping event, but did not predict willingness to help 
when estimating ways the person could be helped by visualizing comments posted on a website 
depicting how to help the person in need. Thus, it appears that the vividness of episodic helping 
events -rather than the vividness of imagery in general- predicts willingness to help. Regression 
lines presented for significant effects. 
 
 
Such differences could reflect an effect on prosocial intentions that is unique to episodic 
simulation. Conversely, as noted earlier recent work in psychology and neuroscience suggests 
that episodic simulation draws on many of the same mental and neural processes as episodic 
memory
 (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Schacter et al., 2012; Szpunar, 2010). This 
observation raises the possibility that the differences shown in Experiment 2 are not uniquely 	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associated with imagining a specific scenario of helping a person in need, but rather arise from 
explicitly constructing a specific helping scenario -an episodic representation– regardless of 
whether it was imagined or remembered. In Experiment 3, we attempted to distinguish between 
these competing accounts by determining whether the episodic empathy effect is limited to 
simulating imagined events or whether it generalizes to episodic remembering of actual events.  
Experiment 3   
Results from comparing performance in the Imagine Helping, Remember Helping, and 
No Helping: Story conditions reinforced and extended the findings from Experiment 1 and 2. 
Participants were more willing to help people in need when they imagined helping the person 
than when they were merely exposed to the person’s plight, (t(29) = 5.88, p < .001; see Figure 
3.2b).  Remembering a past helping experience also increased willingness to help a person in 
need compared to exposure to the person’s plight (t(29) = 4.88, p < .001).  Notably, imagining 
helping events did not promote willingness to help to a greater extent than remembering helping 
events (t(29) = 1.59, p = .123). Therefore, the increase in prosocial intentions appears to be 
similar across episodic memory and episodic simulation. Next, we examined whether this effect 
operated through similar cognitive mechanisms. 
  Bolstering the findings from Experiment 2, we again observed evidence that episodic 
vividness influences willingness to help. We found that more detailed and coherent imagined 
events were associated with increased willingness to help (r(28) = .67, p < .001; r(28) = .59, p = 
.001). Similarly, more detailed and coherent remembered events were also associated with 
increased willingness to help (r(28) = .47, p = .009; r(28) = .38, p = .039; see Figure 3.3c, 3.3d). 
Taken together, these results suggest that the episodic vividness of a constructed event may 
promote prosocial intentions regardless of whether the helping event is imagined or remembered.  	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Despite the fact that imagining and remembering fostered episodic empathy to a similar 
extent, Experiment 3 provided some evidence that imagining produces an advantage in the range 
of prosocial experiences it facilitates: (i) participants were unable to retrieve helping experiences 
for several stories, but participants were able to imagine a helping event for all stories (see 
Figure 3.4), chi-square test of independence (Χ
2 (1, N = 600) = 41.71, p < .001); (ii) on these 
“missed” memory trials, willingness to help was reduced to baseline levels; and (iii) the less 
related a memory was to the present situation of need the less willing the participant was to help 
(r(29) = .40, p = .028). These findings underscore the prosocial utility of episodic simulation: it 
overcomes the narrowness of past experiences by allowing people to empathize with novel 
situations they have not directly experienced themselves.  
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Figure 3.4. The range of the empathic effect of memory is limited. Although imagining and 
remembering a helping event increased willingness to help to a similar degree, the empathic 
effect of memory depended on the successful retrieval of related helping events (Remember 
“hits”) in Experiment 3. Participants were able to imagine, but not remember, a helping event for 
all trials (Remember “misses”; 39/300 trials collected in the Remember Helping condition 
ranging across 21/30 stories of need). On these failed memory trials, willingness to help was 
reduced to baseline (mean = 4.27). These findings highlight a flexible advantage of episodic 
simulation in facilitating empathy for situations of need that have not been personally 
experienced in the past. Charts displayed for descriptive purposes only. 
 
Perspective Taking  
While we have emphasized the role of episodic vividness in underlying the facilitating 
effect of imagining and remembering on empathy, our previous analyses do not preclude a role 
of perspective taking in mediating this effect. One possible interpretation of our results is that 
access to vivid episodic representations does not directly facilitate prosocial intentions; instead, it 	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may only serve to enhance adopting the thoughts and feelings (i.e. perspective taking) of people 
in need, which in turn elicits prosocial intentions to help. However, the data do not support this 
notion. If perspective taking fully accounts for the preferential and parallel increase in 
willingness to help for episodic processes (i.e. Imagine Helping and Remember Helping 
conditions), then perspective taking should significantly differ for estimating and imagining in 
Experiment 2 and should not differ between imagining and remembering in Experiment 3. In 
fact, estimating and imagining did not significantly differ with respect to perspective taking 
(t(29) = 1.8, p = .075), whereas imagining and remembering did (t(29) = 2.46, p = .020).  
Emotional Concern  
To assess the role of emotional reactions in supporting prosocial intentions, participants 
rated the degree to which they experienced 12 different emotions (intrigued; softhearted; 
troubled; warm; distressed; sympathetic; intent; compassionate; disturbed; tender; moved; 
worried) for each story of need following the experimental task session. Selected from a subset 
of emotions measured in past studies, this constellation of emotions was used so as to include a 
measure of emotional concern within a larger array of emotions, thereby minimizing 
participants’ awareness of this construct (Batson, 2011; Batson, Early, et al., 1997). We did not 
observe evidence of a consistent relationship between willingness to help and emotional 
reactions. However, there was some tentative evidence suggesting that the emotion of sympathy 
may contribute to willingness to help in the current paradigm.  
In Experiment 2, there was a trending effect of sympathy for the person in need to predict 
willingness to help when considering the journalistic style and source of story depicting people 
in need (r(28) = .33, p = .075). However, sympathy did not show a trending effect for 
willingness to help when estimating ways the person could be helped (r(28) = .21, p = .278) or 	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imagining an episode of helping (r(28) = .181, p = .338). In Experiment 3, the relationship 
between emotion and willingness to help was selective to that of sympathy, as this was the only 
emotion to significantly predict willingness to help. Sympathy ratings significantly predicted 
willingness to help when considering the journalistic style and source of stories (r(28) = .62, p < 
.001). There was also a significant effect of sympathy on willingness to help for memory (r(28) 
= .52, p = .003) and, to a lesser extent, when subjects imagined scenarios of helping (r(28) = .38, 
p = .039). This mixed pattern of results across experiments does not allow strong conclusions to 
be drawn about the relationship between sympathy and willingness to help in the current 
paradigm. However, it is consistent with previous work finding that sympathy is preferentially 
evoked by perceived need
 (Lishner, Batson, & Huss, 2011). While sympathy may play a role in 
facilitating prosocial intentions, it does not appear to strongly, if at all, contribute to the episodic 
empathy effect (i.e. the selective increase in willingness to help as a consequence of 
remembering and imagining events). 
Discussion 
In three experiments, people increased prosocial intentions when they constructed  
episodes of helping people in need. Our findings show that these prosocial facilitating effects are 
difficult to explain in terms of the known prosocial influences of degree of perspective taking or 
emotional responses and suggest that the episodic vividness of constructed experiences informs 
our willingness to help others. Although episodic simulation and memory facilitated prosocial 
intentions to a similar extent, the influence of memory was limited to the successful retrieval of 
related events, whereas simulation was readily deployed to facilitate prosocial intentions more 
broadly, including situations that had not been directly and personally experienced. 	 ﾠ 82	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Our results nicely align with a recent study of attenuated empathic responses in amnesic 
patients (Beadle et al., 2013). Amnesic patients, suffering damage to the medial temporal lobe, 
displayed lower levels of trait empathy, were less responsive to empathy inductions, and were 
less prosocial in a social-economic context (e.g., the Dictator Game) compared to healthy 
controls. Yet, the cognitive mechanisms underlying these empathic deficits were not directly 
examined in this study. Given that episodic vividness predicted willingness to help people in 
need in the experiments we reported here, an intriguing possibility is that amnesic patients’ 
impaired abilities to remember and imagine episodic representations directly affected judgments 
of empathy, hindering access to diagnostic knowledge that can be used to guide decisions about 
future helping actions. While this possibility awaits direct empirical investigation, the 
experiments reported here provide an important starting point for research that could be used to 
develop new strategies targeted at episodic mechanisms for promoting empathy, as well as to 
guide research characterizing and improving empathic deficits in patient populations suffering 
from episodic memory and simulation
 (Beadle et al., 2013). 
Rather than rule out a role of perspective taking or emotional concern in supporting 
prosocial intentions observed in previous studies, our experiments support past findings, but also 
build upon them by identifying an additional mechanism to increase prosociality. The pattern of 
results suggests that a distinction exists between the contributions of episodic simulation and 
memory to facilitating willingness to help on the one hand and the role of perspective taking on 
the other, at least in the experiments discussed here. An important direction for future work will 
be further delineating the relation between episodic and perspective taking processes
 
(Rosenbaum, Stuss, Levine, & Tulving, 2007) in fostering prosocial tendencies. 	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Moreover, our results also do not eliminate a role for emotions in contributing to the 
episodic empathy effect. Indeed previous studies have observed that (i) the perceived likelihood 
that an imagined event will happen has been shown to be selective to emotional experiences
 
(Szpunar & Schacter, 2013), (ii) imagining positive social interactions appears to be central to 
improving attitudes towards and intentions to interact with outgroup members
 (Crisp & Turner, 
2009), and (iii) remembering good deeds selectively increases charitable donations
 (Young, 
Chakroff, & Tom, 2012). Thus, we suspect that imagining and remembering positively valenced 
helping interactions may play a role in eliciting the episodic empathy effect.  
Humans are an evolutionary success partially because of our ability to collaborate with 
and help those in need. To the extent that society seeks to foster these socially desirable 
tendencies, investigating and understanding mental processes that shape empathy is crucial. 
Several cognitive and emotional mechanisms have already been elucidated and extensively 
studied by psychology and neuroscience. However, humans may possess at least one more tool 
that can be used to facilitate prosociality: the ability to construct empathic episodes. By 
imagining and remembering our own experiences it seems we can come to empathize with the 
experiences of others. 
 
Materials and Methods
 
Participants 
We recruited a total of 75 participants from a local college (restricted to students under 
the age of 35) to participate in three experiments described as investigations of their reactions to 
stories depicting real events adapted from various online media (e.g., Twitter, Tumblr, New York 
Times) and how these reactions related to different mental abilities
 (Coke et al., 1978; Rameson 	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et al., 2011). Participants received $10 per hour for their participation. All experiments were 
conducted in compliance with the IRB at Harvard University. 
Procedure   
After reviewing instructions and completing practice trials (one trial per condition) to 
ensure task comprehension, participants read 30 stories depicting a person in need presented for 
10 seconds each. Following the presentation of each story, participants were pseudo-randomly 
instructed to complete one of five tasks: (i) complete math problems that involved social 
interactions unrelated to the story of need (No Helping: Math), (ii) consider the journalistic style 
and online source for stories of need (No Helping: Story), (iii) estimate ways the person in need 
could be helped by visualizing a possible source website and discussion comments that would 
recommend how the person could be helped (Estimate Helping), (iv) imagine an episodic event 
of helping that person (Imagine Helping), or (v) remember a past experience of helping that 
person (Remember Helping). Control conditions were designed to recruit semantic retrieval, 
social cognition, and generation of helping examples. The Imagine and Remember Helping 
conditions alone required constructing a temporally and contextually specific episodic event. 
Participants had one minute to complete each task for a given trial. Ten trials were presented per 
condition per experiment. Thus, a total of 20 trials consisting of i and iv were collected for 
Experiment 1 (N = 15, 13 females, mean age = 21.6 standard deviation = 3.0), a total of 30 trials 
consisting of ii, iii, and iv were collected in the Experiment 2 (N = 30, 24 females, mean age = 
21.8 standard deviation = 2.9), and a total of 30 trials consisting of i, iv, and v were collected in 
the Experiment 3 (N = 30, 21 females, mean age = 20.3, standard deviation = 2.4).  
Next, all the stories were re-presented and participants rated phenomenological 
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probability that they would be willing to help the people from the stories on 1-7 Likert scales in a 
self-paced manner, as well as provide brief descriptions of what ways they thought about, 
imagined, or remembered helping. Experiment 1 only included a subset of these measures 
targeted at willingness to help and event descriptions to ensure task compliance. For Experiment 
3, in addition to the same dependent measures as in Experiment 2, participants also indicated the 
similarity of past experiences with the currently presented scenarios of need. This measure was 
included because having personally experienced similar episodes in one’s past has been shown to 
increase empathy for others, and therefore the degree of relatedness may modulate prosocial 
intentions in the current study (Bluck et al., 2013; Hodges et al., 2009)
.  
At the conclusion of an experiment, subjects were asked to indicate what the hypotheses 
were. None indicated as a possible hypothesis that memory or imagination would selectively 
increase willingness to help others and that this effect would be supported by the vividness of 
remembered or imagined events. All together, Experiments 2 and 3 each lasted approximately 2 
hours in the lab, and Experiment 1 lasted approximately 1.5 hours in the lab. For Experiments 2 
and 3, personality trait measures were collected one to two weeks prior to participation, but these 
did not reveal consistent results across experiments. 
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General Discussion 
  The three papers comprising this dissertation examined the contributions of episodic and 
non-episodic processes to supporting imagined future events, thereby expanding our 
understanding of the nature of episodic simulation, the processes that inform its expression, and 
the functions it serves. Specifically, Paper 1 demonstrated that deficits in older adults previously 
viewed as impairments in episodic imagining and remembering are partially attributable to 
differences in non-episodic processes; Paper 2 delineated component processes that contribute to 
imagined events, suggesting that the role of the hippocampus involves actively constructing 
imagined representations; Paper 3 revealed that episodic simulation and episodic memory can be 
used to facilitate empathy and hints at a previously unconsidered function of episodic processes 
in shaping our species’ prosocial tendencies. 
As such, these papers broadly offer empirical support for recent proposals regarding the 
structure and function of episodic simulation and episodic memory. As discussed earlier, recent 
work has established that remembering the past and imagining the future rely on strikingly 
similar cognitive and neural processes (Addis et al., 2007; Addis et al., 2011; Okuda et al., 2003; 
Spreng et al., 2009; Szpunar et al., 2007; see, Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter et al., 2012; 
Szpunar, 2010 for reviews), leading to the proposal that future simulations consist of recombined 
details stored across episodic memories and require additional constructive processing in order to 
form coherent hypothetical events (Schacter & Addis, 2007, 2009). By simulating hypothetical 
future events, we can mentally “test” alternative hypothetical scenarios of what might happen, 
imagine how selecting different actions would play out, and winnow options down to the 
preferred outcome. From this perspective, the adaptive value of imagined events mainly draws 
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 ﾠ
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Ingvar, 1979; Schacter & Addis, 2007, 2009; Schacter et al., 2008; 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 2005). The papers in this dissertation bolster specific 
aspects of this foundational work, but more than that, they build on it by expanding and 
sharpening conceptions of the underlying mechanisms as well as suggesting a novel functional 
role for episodic simulation.  
Paper 1 reported a robust age-related description deficit compared with a modest age-
related deficit specific to memory and imagination. In two experiments, we evaluated whether 
the detail deficits observed for episodic simulation and memory extend to descriptions (i.e., 
verbal reports) of pictures for everyday scenes—a task that does not explicitly rely on episodic 
processes, since the picture is presented in front of the participant for the duration of the trial. 
The largest difference between older and younger adults was on the description task and not the 
episodic simulation or memory tasks. On the one hand, this study adds to the evidence that a 
deficit specific to episodic simulation and memory in older adults does indeed exist (Addis et al., 
2008; Levine et al., 2002). On the other hand, the evidence from this study should temper 
interpretations of the size of episodic simulation and memory deficits in older adults and 
emphasizes the role of non-episodic processes (i.e., narrative style, inhibitory deficits) in 
mediating these deficits. 
Previous observations of hippocampal activity when imagining events could reflect 
cognitive processes related to the demands of constructing imaginary events, encoding these 
novel events into memory, novelty detection, or some combination of these processes. Thus, to 
fully understand the contributions of the hippocampus to episodic simulation, it is important to 
control for these highly related processes. Using a design that combined an experimental 
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component processes recruited for imagining events and evaluated whether these processes are 
supported by the hippocampus. After accounting for effects of subsequent memory and task 
novelty, Paper 2 identified a region in the hippocampus that was preferentially activated for 
newly constructed imagined events. In particular, our data suggest that a specific region within 
the left lateral posterior hippocampus may uniquely contribute to the construction of imagined 
future events. These results support the hypothesis that the hippocampus may support several 
distinct but related processes that are critical for imagining future events (Addis & Schacter, 
2012). Moreover, they help to make sense of the aforementioned inconsistencies in the 
neuropsychological literature, suggesting that the existence and type of deficits in imagining 
exhibited by a patient with MTL damage may very well depend on the precise subregions of the 
hippocampus that are damaged and spared (Mullally et al., 2013).  
Paper 3 revealed that when participants imagined a specific event of helping a person in 
need, or remembered a related helping event, they were more willing to express prosocial 
intentions to help that person. This effect of episodic processes on empathy held after controlling 
for the degree of considering the thoughts and feelings of the person in need (i.e., perspective 
taking, theory of mind, or mentalizing), a factor previously shown to modulate willingness to 
help. The episodic empathy effect is not simply explained by theory of mind or emotional 
concern, because sensory detail and coherence of the imagined and remembered helping events 
predicted willingness to help. The more detailed and coherent an episodic event, the more willing 
participants were to express the intention to help people in need. Although episodic simulation 
and memory both increased a willingness to help, the effect of episodic simulation on empathy 
was uniquely flexible. That is, participants were at times unable to remember a related helping 
event (if they had not experienced a related event in their personal past); however, participants 	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were able to imagine a helping event for every trial. On these “missed” memory trials, 
willingness to help remained at baseline levels. These findings suggest a possible flexible, 
prosocial advantage of episodic simulation over memory: episodic simulation overcomes the 
narrowness of our personal pasts, allowing us to empathize with people facing novel experiences 
that differ from our own. 
The findings of the three papers comprising this dissertation have a number of 
implications with theoretical, clinical, and applied significance. For the most part, the 
implications of each paper are independent of one another. However, there is a clear and 
intriguing line of research that could arise from drawing on seemingly disconnected findings 
across papers. Towards the end of my discussion I will delve into the implications that only arise 
from considering the findings of the papers in tandem. 
Theoretical Implications 
  Papers 1 and 2 add to the growing literature suggesting a tight link between episodic 
simulation and episodic memory. Paper 1 strengthens claims that specificity deficits in older 
adults derive—at least in part—from impairments in remembering the past and imagining the 
future (Addis et al., 2008; Addis et al., 2010; Romero & Moscovitch, 2012). Paper 1 also 
suggests that in order to fully explain age-related differences in specificity, theoretical models 
will need to incorporate some aspect of non-episodic processes. Consistent with this notion, 
Rendell and colleagues (2012) recently contrasted age-related differences when generating 
atemporal scenarios (similar to those used in Hassabis et al., 2007), narratives that involve 
moving through a scene, and episodic future events. The researchers showed that older adults 
produced significantly less detail than young adults across tasks, suggesting that age-related 
difficulty in imagining episodic future events largely reflects non-episodic differences (e.g., 	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narrative style, descriptive ability). However, similar to the findings of Paper 1, the researchers 
also found evidence that older adults’ deficits in imagining future episodic events are 
exacerbated relative to control tasks. Together, these studies demonstrate that age deficits in 
remembering the past and imagining the future are mostly attributable to non-episodic processes. 
More generally, these studies call into question the theoretical interpretation of the similarities 
between remembering and imagining as evidence of shared episodic mechanisms.  
According to the constructive episodic simulation framework, the shared episodic 
mechanisms hypothesized to support remembering and imagining should be distinguishable from 
non-episodic processes that support picture description. We recently tested this hypothesis by 
investigating the impact of an episodic specificity induction on memory, imagination, and picture 
description in young and older adults (Madore, Gaesser, & Schacter, in press). The results 
showed that the specificity induction selectively increased episodic detail on subsequent memory 
and imagination tasks in both young and older adults, but had no effect on a picture description 
task, and thus dissociated the episodic processes supporting memory and imagination from non-
episodic processes recruited for picture description.  Considered together with the findings of 
Paper 1, it seems that while non-episodic processes may largely account for age-related changes 
in remembering and imagining, episodic processes also provide a distinct contribution to 
remembering and imaging.  
Paper 2 reinforces the hypothesis that the hippocampus contributes to imagining 
hypothetical events (Addis et al., 2007; Addis & Schacter, 2008; Weiler et al., 2010). More 
specifically, Paper 2 supports a multifaceted view of the hippocampus: distinct subregions of the 
hippocampus contribute to recombining details into coherent events, recognizing when imagined 
events consist of novel information, and encoding these events into memory for later use (Addis 	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& Schacter, 2012; Szpunar, Addis, McLelland, & Schacter, 2013). Previous work emphasized 
that the anterior hippocampus may underlie recombination processes. However, based on the 
results of Paper 2, previous observations of anterior hippocampal activity likely reflect encoding 
of novel events into episodic memory rather than their construction. Consistent with this 
interpretation, Martin et al. (2011) recently found that activity in the anterior hippocampus was 
strongly related to subsequent memory for imagined future events. 
While Papers 1 and 2 have theoretical implications regarding the mechanisms underlying 
imagined events, Paper 3 provides insight into a novel functional account of why humans are 
equipped with episodic simulation in the first place (Gaesser, 2013). This functional account 
expands the possible adaptive benefits of episodic simulation from prediction, planning (e.g., 
“previewing” the outcomes of hypothetical alternative scenarios) and emotional regulation 
(Schacter, 2012) to now include facilitating prosociality. The adaptive function of facilitating 
prosociality is not necessarily mutually exclusive with previous functional accounts of episodic 
simulation. However, given the fundamental role that prosociality is thought to play in driving 
our species’ evolutionary success (Adolphs, 1999; Dunbar, 1998; Nowak & Highfield, 2011; 
Rand et al., 2012; Tomasello, 2000; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012), facilitating prosociality likely 
constitutes one of episodic simulation’s primary advantages.  
Clinical Implications 
To the extent that Paper 1 demonstrates AI performance in healthy older adults for 
remembering the past and imagining the future is largely attributed to non-episodic processes, 
the question remains whether or not other populations with known memory and simulation 
deficits on the AI will show a similar parallel difference across remembering, imagining, and 
describing pictures. In the absence of a non-episodic control condition similar to the picture 	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description task, previously observed memory and imagination deficits could result from broader 
differences in non-episodic processes (Addis, Sacchetti, et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2013; 
D’Argembeau, Raffard, et al., 2008; Gamboz et al., 2010; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 
2007; Klein et al., 2002; Rasmussen & Berntsen, in press; Tulving, 1985; Williams et al., 1996).  
Of particular theoretical interest is the pattern of imagining, remembering, and describing 
pictures in populations with a selective deficit restricted to the domain of episodic processes. 
One neuropsychological condition with an isolated episodic deficit and reduced specificity for 
imagining and remembering is amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI, a precursor to 
Alzheimer’s disease; Gamboz et al., 2010). The restricted impairment in episodic processes, 
likely the result of hippocampal damage, makes aMCI patients a clinical population well suited 
for studying the relationship between imagining the future, remembering the past, and describing 
the present. If episodic specificity deficits in aMCI patients extend beyond generating past and 
future events to include descriptions of the pictures, then it opens the possibility that the 
impairment is cognitively less selective than initially conceived. A study by Gaesser et al. (in 
preparation) using the AI and a design similar to that described in Paper 1 indicates that aMCI 
patients exhibit impairments in episodic simulation and memory as previously shown (Gamboz 
et al., 2010), but are also impaired on the picture description task, suggesting that non-episodic 
processes may also be affected in aMCI. The question now remains whether other patient 
populations, such as patients with Alzheimer’s disease, may show less selective deficits on these 
measures than previously thought (e.g., Addis, Sacchetti, et al., 2009). This line of work provides 
a greater understanding of age-related decline in episodic simulation and memory of healthy and 
pathological older adults and begins to reveal the link between episodic processes and higher-
order non-episodic processes (e.g., narrative style, communicative goals) that shape its 	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expression. Paper 1 will help guide future studies targeted at better characterizing deficits in 
psychiatric and neurological disorders and in time possibly contribute to developing 
interventions targeted at these mechanisms. 
Similarly, the findings from Paper 3 will also inform the diagnosis and treatment of 
mental disorders in several ways. First, this research has the potential to identify previously 
unconsidered cognitive mechanisms involving episodic simulation and memory that may 
underlie disorders of empathy (e.g., psychopathy, acquired sociopathy). Second, these findings 
provide the basis for a unique prediction: the severity of deficits in episodic simulation and 
memory (e.g., amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) patients and Alzheimer’s disease 
patients) will track with the severity of empathic deficits under certain conditions. For example, 
patients with mild to moderate memory deficits generate reduced episodic detail when imagining 
or remembering events; interventions directed at enhancing episodic detail might also be useful 
in enhancing empathy (Maestas & Rude, 2012; Madore, et al., in press; Neshat-Doost et al., 
2012; Rudoy et al., 2009). Third, interventions directed at episodic detail may be especially 
effective at enhancing empathy in disorders characterized by impairments in perspective taking 
(or theory of mind) by providing an alternative route to affect empathy (Blair, 2005; Kahn, Byrd, 
& Pardini, 2013; Young, Koenigs, Kruepke, & Newman, 2012). Paper 3 therefore lays the 
foundation for work that could one day guide the development of interventions targeted at 
enhancing empathy via episodic processes with the goal of mitigating empathic deficits observed 
in mental disorders. 
Applied Implications 
  The findings from Paper 1 showed that specificity deficits in older adults’ imagined and 
remembered events remained after controlling for differences in picture description, suggesting 	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that older adults’ deficits partially reflect impairments selective to episodic processes. As 
mentioned above, Madore et al. (in press) selectively attenuated specificity deficits in the 
memory and simulation tasks through specificity inductions that targeted episodic processes. The 
implications of these findings, however, may extend beyond the domain of memory. Given the 
known role of episodic processes in supporting everyday functions, an intriguing possibility is 
that similar kinds of episodic specificity inductions could be applied to help college students 
perform better on exams (Taylor et al., 1998), older adults solve problems independently 
(Sheldon et al., 2011; see also Gerlach et al., 2011), and all of us make more farsighted decisions 
by overcoming temporal discounting (Benoit et al., 2011; Peters & Büchel, 2010).  
Expanding on these everyday functions, Paper 3 suggests that episodic processes could 
be used to foster empathy with implications for increasing socially desirable behavior and 
significant health benefits. Prosocial interactions are known to improve well-being and self-
esteem, educational and occupational achievement, and the ability to independently perform 
everyday physical activities (i.e., functional ability; Aknin, Hamlin, & Dunn, 2012; Caprara & 
Steca, 2005; Weinstein & Ryan, 2010; Wilson, 2000). Additional health benefits of behaving 
prosocially include decreasing school truancy
 and even increasing overall quality of life
 (Musick, 
Herzog, & House, 1999; Wilson, 2000). Research has shown, for example, lower mortality rates 
among older adults who volunteer, compared to non-volunteers
 (Musick et al., 1999). The 
findings from Paper 3 reveal novel cognitive mechanisms for enhancing empathy that could then 
be used to develop new strategies for promoting social interactions with positive health 
consequences in everyday life in healthy young and older adults.  
  It is on this last point where the implications from across papers merge. Paper 1 
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reduced episodic detail compared to young adults. Paper 3 revealed that episodic detail predicted 
willingness to help a person in need. Taken together, a straightforward prediction emerging from 
these findings is that the facilitating effect of episodic processes on willingness to help will be 
diminished or absent in older adults depending on the degree of their deficits in episodic detail. 
In light of the extant literature that decisively shows older adults are more prosocial compared to 
young adults, this prediction may initially appear counterintuitive (Bailey, Ruffman, & Rendell, 
2013; Gruhn, Rebucal, Diehl, Lumley, & Labouvie-Vief, 2008; Richter & Kunzmann, 2011; Sze, 
Gyurak, Goodkind, & Levenson, 2012). However, these differing perspectives could be easily 
reconciled if older adults are generally more prosocial based on non-episodic processes (e.g., 
increased emotional reactivity, or shifts to more social and emotionally meaningful goals); that 
is, increased prosociality in older adults may exist despite lacking a “prosocial boost” from 
episodic processes. Pilot studies currently underway in which old and young adults are given a 
modified version of the procedures described in Paper 3 suggest that this is indeed the case. The 
next step is to see whether our interventions targeted at enhancing episodic detail (Madore et al., 
in press) might be used to further enhance empathy in older adults. 
Outstanding Questions 
In closing this dissertation, I will discuss several outstanding questions that arise from the 
findings of my papers, questions that reflect what I believe will be the crucial and exciting 
directions for research to investigate moving forward. 
Although a great deal of research has examined the cognitive basis of remembering 
episodic events, less is known about the nature of imagining episodic events, and almost nothing 
is known about how the two relate to social decision-making. Paper 3 will serve as the 
springboard for my future work at the intersection of episodic simulation, memory, and social 	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decision-making.
 As an independent investigator, I am most interested in further elucidating the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying these intertwined processes and applying this knowledge to 
facilitate socially desirable behavior that promotes mental health. I will therefore focus my 
discussion in this section on questions that surface from this line of experiments.  
Episodic vividness: correlation or causation? 
Across three experiments in Paper 3, imagining helping a person in need increased 
willingness to help that individual relative to control conditions. Though the effect of episodic 
processes on empathy appears robust, much work is still needed to illuminate the underlying 
mechanisms. Paper 3 showed that the episodic vividness of imagined helping events predicted a 
willingness to help people in need: the more detailed and coherent an episodic helping event was, 
the more willing an individual was to help a person in need. However, episodic vividness was 
not directly manipulated, and thus it is currently unknown whether episodic vividness causally 
influences, or is merely correlated with, a willingness to help others. Consistent with a causal 
influence, previous research on intergroup contact has shown that instructing participants to 
imagine specifically when and where (two defining features of episodic experiences, Tulving, 
2002) they would positively interact with unfamiliar others increased the vividness of an 
imagined event, and subsequently, increased intentions to interact with unfamiliar others 
independent of changes in attitude and anxiety (Husnu & Crisp, 2010). Similarly, episodic detail 
in an imagination-inflation paradigm has been shown to track with the subjective plausibility of 
imagined events (Szpunar & Schacter, 2013).  
To explicitly address this issue, a variety of manipulations drawn from these and related 
studies known to modulate the degree of episodic vividness could be deployed, while observing 
the subsequent impact on a willingness to help others. If episodic vividness causally contributes 	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to facilitating intentions to help others, then experimentally heightening imagined detail and 
coherence should subsequently increase a willingness to help a person in need. However, if the 
episodic vividness manipulations do not impact a willingness to help others, such findings would 
suggest that the facilitating effect of episodic processes on empathy may operate through 
alternative cognitive mechanisms such as those previously documented (e.g., perspective taking, 
self-other identity merger, reward processing; Aknin, Sandstrom, Dunn, & Norton, 2011; Batson, 
et al., 1997; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Coke et al., 1978; Decety, 2005; 
Moll et al., 2006; Mathur et al., 2010; Waytz et al., 2012).  
Does perspective taking mediate the effect of episodic processes on empathy?  
Is this empathic effect driven solely by access to a vivid episodic representation of 
helping? Or is this empathic effect mediated in part or in full by enhanced consideration of 
people’s thoughts and feelings (i.e., theory of mind, or mentalizing)? Although perspective 
taking could not fully account for the increase in willingness to help for episodic processes 
observed in Paper 3, the results did not rule out the possibility that the empathic effect could 
partially be attributed to heightened perspective taking. Perhaps episodic simulation and memory 
facilitate a willingness to help others partially as a result of interactions with theory of mind. For 
instance, considering a person-in-need’s perspective may shape what to imagine in order to most 
suitably help that individual. Another possibility is that the empathic effect of episodic 
simulation operates by making the perspective of the person in need more salient. Of particular 
importance will be designing experiments to disentangle the contributions of episodic processes 
and perspective taking processes to empathy, revealing the exact boundaries of their 
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Contemplating the relationship between episodic and perspective taking processes also 
leads to an intriguing question as to whether or not episodic simulation could enhance empathy 
in the absence of perspective taking. Is perspective taking necessary for episodic simulation to 
enhance a willingness to help others? While perceiving an unpleasant mental state in another 
person (De Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005) may be a necessary 
cognitive step to elicit helping (Chakroff & Young, in press), it is less clear whether the ability to 
adopt another person’s thoughts and beliefs is required. At this point, we are left to speculate—
though I am confident we will not be left speculating for much longer. 
Are there empathic asymmetries between episodic simulation and episodic memory? 
Imagining and remembering facilitated empathy to a similar degree in Paper 3. While 
imagining and remembering events rely on many of the same cognitive processes, important 
differences have also been noted in the literature (Schacter et al., 2012). Paper 3 provided some 
evidence that episodic vividness plays a role in supporting the effect of both imagining and 
remembering; however, it is unknown whether differences in the way people imagine and 
remember asymmetrically support the facilitating effect of simulation and memory on empathy. 
Three differences are most relevant to the current discussion. First, remembered events are 
associated with greater perceptual details than imagined events (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; 
D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004; Johnson et al., 1988; McDonough & Gallo, 2010). 
Second, people tend to experience more intense emotions when they anticipate future 
experiences than when they reflect on past experiences (Carsuo, 2010; Van Boven & Ashworth, 
2007). Third, imagined future events tend to be even more emotionally positive and idyllic than 
remembered past events (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; 
Gallo, Korthauer, McDonough, Teshale, & Johnson, 2011; Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003; 	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Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013). Such a positivity bias is associated with a heightened sense of 
imagery, sense of reliving, vividness, and closer temporal distance (Ramussen & Berntsen, 2013; 
see Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009; Wilson, Gunn, & Ross, 2009 for related reviews).  
Whether these phenomenological differences in perception and emotion produce 
asymmetrical effects on empathy remains an open question. Currently, though, we have gained 
some insight into understanding differences in the range of empathic events episodic simulation 
and memory can facilitate. Paper 3 highlights a possible flexible advantage of episodic 
simulation over memory, allowing us to empathize with people facing novel experiences that 
diverge from our own. Further illumination of the mechanisms underlying this flexible advantage 
will be an important goal of future work. 
 Do episodic processes normally support prosociality? 
  While there is now empirical evidence that episodic processes can be used to facilitate 
prosocial intentions, this should not be interpreted as evidence that episodic processes will 
facilitate prosociality in all cases. Indeed, there may be particular cases in which episodic 
processes could in fact produce the opposite effect and inhibit prosocial intentions. For example, 
if the contents of imagined and remembered events are focused on how burdensome the required 
helping actions would be or probable damage to the self, then episodic processes may reduce the 
likelihood of prosocial intervention. However, I am tentatively encouraged that the scales may 
tip in favor of facilitating prosociality based on the well-established positivity bias noted in the 
previous section (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009; Wilson et al., 2009)—that is, to the extent that 
prosocial events are considered positive experiences, they are more likely to be imagined and 
remembered, and are more likely to be vividly experienced compared to negative experiences. 
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remembering bad deeds had no effect on behavior (Young et al., 2012). Paper 3 demonstrates 
that episodic simulation and memory can be used to facilitate prosocial intentions, but whether 
these processes normally facilitate prosociality is an open question of great applied and 
theoretical significance. 
Do intentions to help translate into actual helping behavior? 
The link between intentions to help and helping behavior is where the theoretical rubber 
hits the road of everyday life. Can the empathic effect of episodic processes be used to help 
actual people in need outside of the laboratory? That is, does an increase in prosocial intentions 
engendered by imagining or remembering a helping event translate into an increase in actual 
prosocial behavior? Although it may be too arduous to observe participants engaging in everyday 
prosocial behavior (e.g., repairing broken-down cars, putting out kitchen fires, assisting the 
elderly), recent studies have begun to successfully gain traction on prosocial behavior by 
examining donating behaviors (Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Milinski et al., 2002; Young et 
al., 2012). To address this issue, I have developed a novel paradigm in coordination with local 
charities that seeks to apply episodic processes to helping actual people in need. Specifically, 
participants imagine or remember helping events using objects that actual people need outside of 
the laboratory and then participants are given the opportunity to donate these objects to charity.   
Conclusion 
Research on memory has recently shifted to include imagining the future. Contributing to 
our understanding of this new landscape, this dissertation investigated the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms underlying episodic simulation, as well as the functions it serves. Paper 1 uncovered 
age-related changes in remembering the past, imagining the future, and describing the present in 
healthy adults. Paper 2 delineated component cognitive and neural processes that contribute to 	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imagining novel events. Paper 3 revealed a role of imagining and remembering in facilitating 
prosocial intentions to help people in need.  
These findings serve as a starting point for future work on episodic simulation, memory, 
and empathy in typically functioning young adults, and, importantly, will guide future work 
targeted at alleviating deficits in older adults and populations afflicted with mental disorders. 
Indeed, follow-up studies are already underway. I view this dissertation less as a capstone of my 
work as a graduate student, and more as a beginning of my career as an independent investigator. 
With any luck, by the time I am a wizened professor, deficits in episodic detail and yet-to-be-
discovered deficits in empathy will have been thoroughly examined and addressed. In the 
meantime, there is much work to do. The future remains a frontier: largely unknown and vast, it 
awaits and invites investigation. Let us heed the invitation, let us go exploring—memory-erasing 
mad scientists be damned. 
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Appendix 
 
Supplementary Information 
Methods.  Participants who only provided partial data, inappropriate responses (e.g., by 
providing responses for trials from the Imagine Helping and No Helping: Story conditions to a 
question explicitly restricted to trials only from the Remember Helping condition), or neglected 
to provide brief descriptions of what they generated for each task were not considered for data 
analysis. Two participants were excluded from data analysis in Experiment 3: one participant 
responded at ceiling for willingness to help across conditions, another participant indicated 
feeling no emotional reactions at all. However, including these outlining participants did not 
significantly affect the primary findings: (i) willingness to help was greater for the Imagine 
Helping condition compared to the No Helping: Story condition (t(31) = 4.64, p < .001), (ii) 
willingness to help was greater for the Remember Helping condition compared to the No 
Helping: Story (t(31) = 3.29, p = .003), and (iii) willingness to help did not significantly differ 
between Imagine Helping and Remember Helping conditions (t(25) = .12, p = .909). 
Materials: Episodic vividness. To evaluate the extent that episodic vividness predicted 
prosocial intentions to help, we included measures of episodic detail and coherence using the 
following scales: 
Detail 
The imagined/remembered scene in your mind was? (1 = simple, 4 =moderately, 7 = detailed). 
Coherence 
The imagined/remembered scene in your mind was (1 = vague, 4 =moderately, 7 = coherent and 
clear). 
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Similarly, for the Estimate Helping condition, participants were asked: 
Detail 
The imagined media website in your mind was? (1 = simple, 4 =moderately, 7 = detailed). 
Coherence 
The imagined media website in your mind was (1 = vague, 4 =moderately, 7 = coherent and 
clear). 
 
In the second experiment, we included an additional measure of episodic vividness: event pre/re-
living. 
How strongly did you experience the imagined/remembered event in your mind? (1= not at all, 4 
= moderately, 7 = vividly, as if you were there) 
 
Further supporting the detail and coherence findings, analyses revealed that the strength of pre-
living predicted willingness to help after imagining helping a person in need (r(28) = .54, p = 
.002), and re-living predicted willingness to help after remembering a past experience related to 
the circumstances of the present person in need (r(28) = .48, p = .008). 
Materials: Example Stories.  We provide below a few stories used to depict people in 
need. Scenarios depicted a variety of situations, and the person in need was presented 
anonymously so as to minimize possible gender or group membership effects. All of stories are 
available from the authors upon request. 
This person's dog has not returned home in the last 24 hours. 
This person is locked out of their house. 
While riding the train, this person is harassed by other passengers 